A

Compendious View

OF THE

RELIGION

OF

NATURE

DELINEATED.

With an

APPENDIX

Concerning the

Chriſtian RELIGION.

——*Non ſordidus auctor*
Naturæ, verique. —— Horat.
—— *Sed ſumma ſequar faſtigia rerum.* Virg.

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A

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OF

RELIGION

AND

NATURE.

Advertiſement.

THIS *Abridgment* was undertaken at firſt only for a private Uſe, and was therefore not originally intended to be publiſhed. As to it's Publication now, if the World receives any Benefit by it, there will be no Need of any Apology for it; but if not, it will be in vain to make one. The Reader however may the eaſier judge of the Performance by the References all along to the Pages of the Original; and the *Abridger* would have him alſo obſerve, that the Author is his Pattern in what he has writ of his own. Perhaps too it may be expected, that ſomewhat ſhould be ſaid here concerning the Author's No-

tion of *Moral Good* and *Evil*. Let it be therefore obſerv'd, that by a Conformity to *Truth*, he means the ſame thing in the general, as a Conformity to the *Nature* of things, *p.* 13, and 22. or to the *Truth of the Caſe* conſider'd in all thoſe it's Circumſtances, which come under a moral Conſideration, *p.* 18, and 25. Which if any one oppoſes as the Rule of Morality, he ought to conſider, by what other means it is poſſible for him, upon the foot of Nature, to judge what is fit or reaſonable to be done, or what is conducive to the common Happineſs, or the contrary; and as ſuch, what is either *Good* or *Evil*, and conſequently agreeable or diſagreeable to the Divine Will. And if this Author has ſomewhere laid too much Streſs on abſtracted Truth, and determin'd too rigorouſly (more rigorouſly perhaps than his own Principles in the main might require) in an Inſtance or two, *p.* 29, 30; it may be an Argument that he is not infallible, but is no Diminution of the Truth of his Principles, as above explain'd: Not

to

to ſay that he has made further amends by what he has ſaid of *Happineſs* and *Reaſon*; and by his Doctrine that the Degrees of Guilt ariſing from the Violation of Truth vary with the Importance of Things. In a word, thoſe who ſay that whatever *naturally tends* to the *common Happineſs* is *good*, and whatever is the contrary is *evil*, ſay nothing againſt the Sentiments of this Author, if they mean ſuch Happineſs as is *true*, *vid. p.* 24. He ſays indeed that it is by the Practice of *Reaſon* and *Truth* only, that this Happineſs is to be purſued, and can be attain'd. In which, if Truth and Reaſon are rightly underſtood, I ſuppoſe all good Moraliſts will agree.

TO
Sr Richard Steele.

I Was much pleaſed, SIR, *as well as ſurprized, when you deſired me to draw up an* Abridgment *of the* Religion of Nature delineated. *The Reſpect I have for you, will always engage me to receive your Commands with Pleaſure; but in this,* SIR, *I am more particularly obliged to you, for giving me ſo delicate an Employment on a Performance which you and the World ſo deſervedly admire, and for your judging me in any Meaſure fit for it. And give me Leave to ſay, it is a juſt Peaſure*

to be ſo employ'd, and to be ſo well thought of by a Perſon, to whom the World owes ſome of the moſt celebrated Writings of the Age; of which too Religion and Morality are ſo much the Theme, and in which there are accordingly noble and excellent Sentiments of both.

As for what I have done in this Abridgment, *I will only ſay, that I wanted not Inclination to do it well. Somewhat too as an* Appendix *I have added of my own, tho' I am ſenſible it may be thought in me too adventurous to have done ſo, tho' but to an Abridgment of ſo great a Writer. But if it were done by any hand equal to his own, there would be no need of defending it. The* Chriſtian Religion *in all reſpects deſerves the greateſt and beſt Advocates; and if I was deſirous to ſay ſomewhat concerning it, it was becauſe ſomewhat of this kind is neceſſary to be ſaid, to give us the* true *Advantages of the* Religion of Nature.

Not that you or I can in the leaſt ſuſpect the Author not to have been a Friend

a Friend to the Chriſtian *Inſtitution. You have told me, he could not have writ, as he has done, had he not borrowed from it; and my own Sentiments the Reader will ſee towards the Concluſion; tho' if what I have ſaid there be agreeable to thoſe, who have Eſteem for Mr.* Wollaſton's *Memory, it is to you they are oblig'd for it, becauſe you directed me to that Apology for him. But I will here ſay no more, but that you will find me endeavouring to follow the Author's Steps as well as I could, and where I fail, that I hope you will excuſe your Friend, who tho' he cannot yet complain of old Age, yet upon other accounts has no reaſon to boaſt of his Advantages for much Study or Application. And thus, humbly requeſting your favourable Acceptance, I commit the whole that follows to your Candour.*

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A Compendious View OF THE RELIGION of NATURE Delineated, &c.

SECT. I.

Of Moral Good *and* Evil.

THE Foundation of Religion lies in that Difference between the Acts of Men, which diſtinguiſhes them into *good*, *evil*, *indifferent*. And there is certainly ſome general *Idea*, or ſome *Rule*, by comparing the aforeſaid Acts with which it may appear, to which kind they reſpectively belong. That which the Author propoſes, is explain'd as follows. *p.* 7.

I. *Acts*

I. *Acts morally good or evil, muſt be thoſe of a Being capable of diſtinguiſhing, chuſing, and acting for himſelf*; or, more briefly, *of an intelligent and free Agent:* Becauſe, in proper ſpeaking, no act at all can be aſcrib'd to that, which is not
P. 8. endued with theſe Capacities. For, if it acts at all, it acts under a Neceſſity incumbent on it from ſomething elſe, and is therefore in reality only *an Inſtrument* in the Hand of that which impoſes the Neceſſity; and cannot properly be ſaid *to act*, but *to be acted.* The Act muſt be the Act of an Agent, therefore not of his Inſtrument: And no Language or Philoſophy ever aſcrib'd Ἦθη or *Mores* to what is only a *Machine.*

II. *Thoſe Propoſitions are true, which expreſs things as they are:* or, *Truth is the Conformity of thoſe Words or Signs, by which Things are expreſs'd, to the Things themſelves.*

III. *A true Propoſition may be denied, or Things may be denied to be what they are, by Deeds, as well as by expreſs Words or another Propoſition.* It is certain there is a Meaning in many Acts and Geſtures, ſuch as Weeping, Laughing, Frowns, *&c.* There are beſides many Acts of *other* kinds, ſuch as conſtitute the Character of a Man's Conduct in Life, which have

in Nature a Signification, as plainly to be underſtood as if it was declar'd in Words: And therefore if what ſuch Acts declare to be, is not, they muſt *contradict Truth*, as much as any falſe Propoſition or Aſſertion can. Thus in the Words of a certain Author: "Suppoſe "ſome Tyrant ſhould command a Chri- "ſtian to burn Incenſe to *Jupiter*, with- "out adding any thing of a verbal Ab- "negation of *Chriſt*: If the Chriſtian "ſhould do this, would it not be ma- "nifeſt to all, that *by that very Act he* "*denied him*", and conſequently denied thoſe Propoſitions which affirm him to be the *Chriſt*, a Teacher of true Religion, and the like? P. 11.

It may not be improperly obſerved by the way, that the *Significancy* here attributed to Men's Acts, proceeds not always from Nature, but ſometimes from Cuſtom and Agreement among People, as that of Words and Sounds moſtly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different Times and Places have different, or even contrary Significations; but thoſe of the former kind, ſuch as are here chiefly intended, have an *unalterable* Signification, and can by no Agreement or Force ever be made to expreſs the contrary to it. From whence it appears, that *Facts* expreſs more ſtrongly, P. 12.

even

even than Words themſelves *; or to contradict any Propoſition by Facts, is a fuller and more effectual Contradiction, than can poſſibly be made by Words only. *Words* are but *arbitrary Signs* of our Ideas, or Indications of our
P. 13. Thoughts; but *Facts* bear certain *Reſpects* to Things as determinate and immutable as any *Ratio*'s are in Mathematicks: For the Facts and the Things they reſpect are *juſt what they are*, as much as any two given Quantities are; and therefore the Reſpects interceding between thoſe muſt be as *fix'd*, as the *Ratio* is which one of theſe bears to the other; that is, they muſt remain the ſame, and always ſpeak the ſame Language, 'till things ceaſe to be what they are.

IV. *No Act* (whether Word or Deed) *of any Being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Propoſition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* For nothing can interfere with any Propoſition that is true, but it muſt likewiſe interfere with Nature (Truth being but a Conformity to Nature) and conſequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in Nature*. Moreover, if
P. 14. there is a Supreme Being, upon whom

* *They profeſs that they know God; but* in Works *they* deny *him*, Tit. i. 16.

the Exiſtence of the World depends, and nothing can be in it but what he either cauſes or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are*, is to own what he cauſes, or at leaſt permits, *to be thus cauſed or permitted:* And this is to take things as he gives them, to go into his Conſtitution of the World, and to ſubmit to his Will, reveal'd in the Books of Nature. To do this therefore muſt be agreeable to *his Will:* And if ſo, the contrary muſt be diſagreeable to it; and ſince (as we ſhall find in due time) there is a perfect Rectitude in his Will, certainly *wrong.* Laſtly, to deny things to be as they are, is a Tranſgreſſion of the great *Law of our Nature*, the Law of Reaſon: For Truth cannot be oppoſed, but Reaſon muſt be violated. Of which more in it's proper place. P. 15.

V. *What has been ſaid of Acts inconſiſtent with Truth, may alſo be ſaid of many Omiſſions or Neglects to act; that is, by theſe alſo true Propoſitions may be denied to be true; and then thoſe Omiſſions, by which this is done, muſt be wrong for the ſame Reaſons with thoſe aſſign'd under the former Propoſition.* P. 16.

It is not indeed always ſo eaſy to know *when* or *how far* Truth is violated by omitting, as by acting. Here therefore

fore more Latitude muſt be allow'd, and much muſt be left to every one's own Judgment and Ingenuity; yet there are *ſome Neglects* or Refuſals to act, which are manifeſtly inconſiſtent with Truth. Thus, if a Man does not deſire to prevent evils and to be happy, he denies both his *own* Nature, and the Nature and Definition of *Happineſs* to be what they are. And then farther, willingly to neglect the *Means*, leading to any ſuch End, is the ſame as not to propoſe that End, and muſt fall under the ſame Cenſure.

P. 17. There are Omiſſions of other kinds, which alſo deſerve to be mention'd, by being either *total* or *notorious*, or upon the ſcore of ſome other Circumſtance. Thus, if I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular Obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I ſhould deny a Man to have a ſqualid Beard by not ſhaving him, or the like. *Many things* are here to be taken into Conſideration (according to the next Propoſition): Perhaps I might intrench upon Truth by *doing* this, and then I cannot by *not doing* it: But if I, being of Ability to afford now and then ſomething in Charity to the Poor, ſhould yet *never* give them any thing at all, I

P. 18. ſhould *then* certainly deny the Condition

of the Poor, and my own to be what they are; and thus Truth would be injured. So again;

If I ſhould not ſay my Prayers at ſuch a certain *Hour*, or in ſuch a certain *Place* and *Manner*, this would not imply a Denial of the Exiſtence of a God, his Providence, or my Dependence upon him; nay, there may be Reaſons perhaps againſt *that particular* Time, Place, Manner. But if I ſhould *never* pray to him, or worſhip him at all, ſuch a *total* Omiſſion would be equivalent to this Aſſertion, *There is no God, who governs the World, to be adored:* Which if there is ſuch a thing, muſt be contrary to Truth. Alſo *generally*, and *notoriouſly* to neglect this Duty (let it be called ſo) though not quite always, will *favour*, if not directly proclaim the ſame Untruth.

Should I, in the laſt place, find a Man in any great Diſtreſs, alone, and without *preſent* Help like to periſh; in this Extremity, if I refuſe to give him my Aſſiſtance immediately according to my Ability, I deny his Caſe to be what it is; human Nature to be what it is; and even thoſe Deſires and Expectations, which I am conſcious to my ſelf I ſhould have under the like Misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it muſt be conſidered not only what*

it is it's ſelf, but alſo what it may be in any other reſpect, which is capable of being denied by Facts and Practice, and the whole Deſcription of the thing taken in. If a Man ſteals a Horſe, and rides away upon him, he may be ſaid indeed by riding him, to uſe him as a *Horſe*, but not as the *Horſe of another*, who gave him no Licence to do this: He does not therefore conſider him as being what he is, unleſs he takes in the Reſpect he bears to his true Owner. In ſhort, all thoſe Properties, Reſpects and Circumſtances, which may be contradicted by Practice, are to be taken into Conſideration: For otherwiſe, the thing conſi-
P. 19. der'd is but imperfectly ſurvey'd; and the whole Compaſs of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in *Part* only, and in other reſpects perhaps as being *what it is not.*

P. 20. VII. *When any Act would be wrong, the forbearing that Act muſt be right; Likewiſe when the Omiſſion of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it muſt be right,* becauſe *of Contraries the Reaſon is contrary.*

VIII. *Moral Good and Evil are co-incident with Right and Wrong.* For that cannot be good which is wrong, nor that evil which is right.

IX. *Every Act* therefore *of an intelligent and free Agent, and all thoſe Omiſſions which interfere with Truth, are morally evil in ſome degree or other: The forbearing ſuch Acts, and the acting in Oppoſition to ſuch Omiſſions are morally good; and when any thing may be either done, or not, equally without the Violation of Truth, that thing is indifferent.* By Truth is here meant any true Propoſition whatſoever, whether containing matter of Speculation, or plain Fact. Every thing ſhould be taken to be *what in Fact and Truth it is.* And thoſe words, *in ſome Degree or other* p. 22. were added, becauſe neither all evil, nor all good Actions are equal. Thoſe Truths which they reſpect, though they are equally true, may compriſe matters of very different Importance, or more Truths may be violated one way than another; and then the Crimes committed by the Violation of them may be equally ſaid to be Crimes, but not *equal Crimes.* Thus the Degrees of Evil p. 22. or Guilt are as the *Importance* and *Number* of Truths violated. On the other ſide, the Value of good Actions will riſe at leaſt in Proportion to the Degrees of Evil in the Omiſſion of them: And therefore they cannot be *equal* any more than the oppoſite evil Omiſſions.

But to return to the *Diſtinction* between moral Good and Evil. Some have

been ſo wild as to deny there is any ſuch thing: But from what has been ſaid, it is manifeſt, that there is as certainly moral *Good* and *Evil*, as there is *true* and *falſe*; and that there is as natural and immutable a Difference between *thoſe* as between *theſe*, the Difference at the bottom being indeed the ſame.

They who place all in *following Nature*, if they mean by that Phraſe acting according to the Natures of things (that is treating things as being what they in Nature
P. 23. are, or according to Truth) ſay what is right. But this does not ſeem to be their Meaning. They who make *right Reaſon* to be the Law, by which our Acts are to be judged, ſay ſomething more particular and preciſe. And it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right Reaſon, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right Reaſon is meant that which is found by the right Uſe of our rational Faculties, this is the ſame with Truth: And what is ſaid by them will be comprehended in what is here ſaid. But the Manner in which they have deliver'd themſelves, is not yet explicite *enough*: It leaves Room for ſo many *Diſputes*, and *oppoſite right Reaſons*, that nothing can be ſettled, while every one pretends that *his* Reaſon *is* right. And beſide, what is

here ſaid, extends farther: For we are not only to reſpect thoſe Truths, which we diſcover by reaſoning, but even ſuch *Matters of Fact*, as are fairly diſcover'd to us by our Senſes. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which Way ſoever we come to the Knowledge of them. They who own nothing to be good but *Pleaſure*, nothing evil but *Pain*, and diſtinguiſh things by their Tendencies to *this* or *that*, do not agree in what this Pleaſure is to be placed, or by what Methods or Actings the moſt of it may be obtain'd. Theſe are left to be Queſtions ſtill: As Men have different Taſtes, different Degrees of Senſe and Philoſophy, the ſame thing cannot be pleaſant to all: And if particular Actions are to be proved by this Teſt, the Morality of them will be very uncertain; the ſame Act may be of *one* Nature to one Man, and of *another* to another. Beſide, unleſs there be ſome ſtrong *Limitation* added as a Fence for Virtue, Men will be apt to ſink into groſs Voluptuouſneſs, as in fact the Generality of *Epicurus*'s Herd have done (notwithſtanding all his Talks of Temperance, Virtue, Tranquillity of Mind *&c.*) and the Bridle will be uſurped by thoſe Appetites which it is a principal part of all Religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and reſtrain. So theſe Men ſay what is in- P. 24.

telligible indeed: But what they ſay is falſe; for not all Pleaſures, but only ſuch Pleaſure as is *true*, or Happineſs, (of which afterwards) may be reckon'd among the *Fines*, or *Ultima Bonorum*.

P. 25. But if the *formal Reaſon* of moral Good and Evil be made to conſiſt in a Conformity of Mens Acts to the *Truth of the Caſe* or the contrary, as it has been here explain'd, the *Diſtinction* ſeems to be ſettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by *a true Propoſition* and *matter of Fact* is underſtood by every Body; ſo it will be eaſy for any one, ſo far as he knows any ſuch Propoſitions and Facts, to compare not only *Words*, but alſo *Actions* with them. A very little Skill and Attention will ſerve to interpret even theſe, and diſcover whether they *ſpeak Truth*, or not.

X. *If there be moral Good and Evil diſtinguiſh'd as before, there is Religion: And ſuch as may moſt properly be ſtyled natural.* By *Religion* is here meant nothing elſe but an Obligation *to do* (under which Word are comprehended Acts both of Body and Mind) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not

P. 26. to be done: So that there muſt be Religion, if there are things, of which ſome ought not to be done, ſome not to be omitted.

omitted. But that there are ſuch, appears from what has been ſaid concerning moral Good and Evil. And then ſince there is *Religion* which follows from the Diſtinction between theſe; ſince this Diſtinction is founded in the Reſpect, which Mens Acts bear to Truth; and ſince no Propoſition can be true, which expreſſes things otherwiſe than as they are in Nature: Since things are ſo, there muſt be Religion, which is founded in Nature, and may upon that account be moſt properly and truly called the *Religion of Nature* or *natural Religion*; the great *Law* of which Religion, the Law of Nature, or rather, (as we ſhall afterwards find Reaſon to call it) of the Author of Nature is,

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free Being ſhould ſo behave himſelf, as by no Act to contradict Truth*, or, *that he ſhould treat every thing as being what it is.*

Tho' to conſider a thing as being *ſomething elſe* than what it is, is an Abſurdity indefenſible, yet *Objections* may be made to what has been here advanced.

It may be ſaid, that from hence it will follow, 1. That to treat my *Enemy* as ſuch is to kill him, or *revenge* my ſelf ſoundly upon him. 2. To uſe a *Creditor*, who is a Spendthrift, or one that knows not the Uſe of Money, or has no Occa-

ſion for it, as *ſuch*, is not to pay him. Nay farther, 3. If I *want Money*, don't I act according to Truth, if I take it from ſome Body elſe to ſupply my own Wants? and more, do not I act contrary to Truth, if I do *not?* 4. If one who plainly appears to have a *Deſign* of killing another, or doing him ſome great Miſchief, if he can find him, ſhould aſk me where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to ſave Life, ſay I do not know, tho' that be falſe? 5. At this rate I may not in a *Frolick* break a Glaſs, or burn a Book: Becauſe forſooth to uſe theſe things as being what they are, is to drink out of the one, not to break
P. 27. it; and to read the other, not to burn it. *Laſtly*, How ſhall a Man *know* what is true? And if he can find out Truth, may he not want the *Power* of acting agreeably to it? As to the *firſt* Objection, if the Objector's Enemy, was *nothing more* than his Enemy, there might be ſome Force in it: But ſince he may be conſidered as ſomething elſe beſide that, viz. *a Man* and a *Fellow-citizen*, he muſt be uſed according to what he is in theſe other Reſpects, as well as in that in which he is denominated the Objector's Enemy. Beſide, the Objector ſhould act with Reſpect to *himſelf* as being what he is; a Man himſelf in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances, and one who has given up

all

all Right to *private Revenge* (for that is the thing meant here.) If Truth therefore be obſerved, the Reſult will be this: The Objector muſt treat his Enemy as *ſomething compounded* of a Man, a Fellow-citizen, and an Enemy, all three; *that is*, he muſt only proſecute him in ſuch a Way, as is agreeable to the Statutes and Methods, which the Society have oblig'd themſelves to obſerve. And even as to *legal Proſecutions*, many things ought to be conſider'd. In Matters of Importance, one will find himſelf obliged, in Duty and Submiſſion to Truth, to take Refuge in the Laws. But in *trifling* P. 28. or *more tolerable* Inſtances, we ſhould act againſt Truth, if we ſhould be at more Charge or Hazard in proſecuting another than we can afford, or the thing loſt or in Danger is worth; ſhould treat one that is an Enemy in little things, as a *great* one; or ſhould deny to make ſome Allowances, and *forgive* ſuch Peccadillos, as the common Frailty of human Nature makes it neceſſary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Laſtly*, in Caſes, of which the Laws of the Place take no Notice, Truth and Nature will be ſufficiently obſerved, if we take the moſt *prudent* Meaſures, that are compatible with the Character of private Perſons, to aſſwage the Malice of our Adverſaries, or prevent the Effects

fects of it; or perhaps, if we ſhould only *not* uſe them as Friends. For to do this, would be to cancel the natural Differences of things, and confound Truth with Untruth.

The Debtor in the ſecond Objection, if he acts as he ſays there, does not only make himſelf the *Judge* of his Creditor, which he is not, but directly denies the Money, which is the Creditor's, to be the Creditor's. To pay a Man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant *&c.* or any other Truth; that Act has no ſuch Signification. It only ſignifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other; and this it naturally doth ſignify.

As to the third *Objection*, acting according to Truth, as that Phraſe is uſed in the Objection, is not the thing required by the Rule; but, ſo to act that *no Truth* may be denied by any Act. Not taking from another Man his Money by Violence, is a Forbearance, which does not ſignify, that I do not want Money, or which denies any Truth. But taking it, *denies* that to be his, which by the Suppoſition *is his.* Even in the Caſe of a Man's wanting Money for *Ne-*
P. 29. *ceſſaries*, and of his having incurr'd this Want thro' ſome *Misfortune*, which he could not prevent; there are Ways of expreſſing this Want, or acting according

ing

ing to it, ſuch as honeſt *Labour* and Induſtry, or the like, without treſpaſſing upon Truth. But if there is no way, by which he can help himſelf without the Violation of Truth, (which can ſcarce be ſuppoſed) he muſt take it as his Fate.

As to the fourth Objection, it is certain that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *Murder*: Whoever is acceſſary to that, offends againſt *many* Truths of *great* Weight. But tho' merely to deny Truth by Words (that is, when they are not productive of Facts to follow; as in judicial Tranſactions, bearing Witneſs, or paſſing Sentence) is not equal to a Denial by *Facts*; tho' an *Abuſe* of Language is allowable in this Caſe, if ever in any; and tho' one might look on a Man in ſuch a fit of Rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *Man* but a *Mad-man:* Yet Truth is *ſacred*, and there are other Ways of coming off with Innocence, by giving timely Notice to the Man in Danger, or the like. *P.* 30.

In Anſwer to the fifth Objection, two things ought to be regarded, 1. That tho' to act againſt Truth in any Caſe is wrong, yet the Degrees of Guilt varying with the Importance of things, in ſome Caſes the Importance one way or t'other may be ſo little as to render the Crime *evaneſcent*, *P.* 31.

neſcent, or *almoſt* nothing. And 2. That *inanimate* Beings cannot be conſider'd as capable of wrong Treatment, if the Reſpect they bear to living Beings is ſeparated from them. The Drinking-glaſs before mention'd could not be conſider'd as ſuch, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking Animal to own and uſe it. Nothing can be of any Importance to that thing its ſelf, which is void of all Life and Perception. So that when we compute what ſuch things are, we muſt take them as being what they are *in Reference* to things that have Life.

The laſt and moſt material *Objection*, or *Queſtion* rather, ſhall be *anſwer'd* by and by. In the mean time, if in any particular Caſe Truth is inacceſſible, then this will be true, *that the Caſe* is doubtful: And to act agreeably to this Truth is to be not opiniative, nor obſtinate, but modeſt, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the ſafer ſide*. And as to the want of *Power* to act agreeably to Truth, that cannot be known till Trials are made: And if any one doth try and do his Endeavour, he may take to himſelf the Satisfaction, which he will find in Sect. IV.

SECT. II.

SECT. II.

Of Happineſs.

THAT, which demands next to be conſider'd, is *Happineſs*; as being in it ſelf moſt conſierable; and as being indeed ſo nearly allied to Truth, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the Reſpects due to one, unleſs we regard the other. Happineſs muſt not be denied to be what it is: And it is by the Practice of Truth that we aim at that Happineſs, which is true.

I. *Pleaſure is a Conſciouſneſs of ſomething agreeable, Pain of the contrary.* Here let theſe things be obſerv'd; P. 32.

1. *Pleaſures and Pains are proportionable to the Perceptions and Senſe of the Perſons affected with them.*

2. *Mens reſpective Happineſs or Pleaſures ought to be valued as they are to the* Perſons themſelves, *whoſe they are; or according to the Thoughts and Senſe which* they *have of them.* If that Prince, who having Plenty and Flocks many, yet raviſh'd the poor Man's ſingle Ewe-lamb P. 33.

out

out of his Boſom, reckon'd the poor Man's Loſs to be not greater, than the Loſs of one of his Lambs would have been to him, he muſt be very defective in moral Arithmetick, and little underſtood the Doctrine of Proportion. Every Man's Happineſs is *his* Happineſs, what
P. 34, it is to him; and the Loſs of it is anſwerable to the Degrees of his Perception, to his Manner of taking things, to his Wants and Circumſtances.

3. *How judicious and wary ought Princes, Lawgivers, Judges, Juries, and even Maſters to be?* They ought not to conſider ſo much what a ſtout, reſolute, obſtinate, harden'd Criminal may bear, as what the weaker Sort, or at leaſt (if that can be known) the Perſons immediately concern'd can bear: *That is*, what any Puniſhment would be to them. For it is certain all Criminals are not of the former Kind, and therefore ſhould not be uſed, as if they were. Some are drawn into Crimes, which may render them obnoxious to publick Juſtice, they ſcarce know how themſelves: Some fall into them through Neceſſity, Strength of Temptation, Deſpair, Elaſticity of Spirits and a ſudden Eruption of Paſſion, Ignorance of Laws, Want of good Education, or ſome natural Infirmity or Propenſion: And ſome who are really innocent, are oppreſt by the Iniquity or

Miſtakes

Miſtakes, of Judges, Witneſſes, Juries, or perhaps by the Power and Zeal of a Faction, with which their Senſe or their Honeſty has not permitted them to join. What a Difference muſt there be between the Sufferings of a poor Wretch ſenſible of his Crime or Misfortune, who would give a World for his Deliverance, if he had it, and thoſe of a ſturdy *Veteran* in Roguery; in ſhort, between a tender Nature and a Brickbat!

4. *In general, all Perſons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concern'd.* Otherwiſe they may do they know not what. For no Man can tell, by himſelf, or any other Way, how another may be affected.

5. *There cannot be an equal Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments by any ſtated human Laws.* Becauſe (among other Reaſons) the ſame thing is rarely either the ſame Gratification, or the ſame Puniſhment to different Perſons.

6. *The Sufferings of Brutes are not like thoſe of Men.* They perceive by Moments, without Reflection upon paſt or future, upon Cauſes, Circumſtances, *&c.* Time and Life without thinking are next Neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-Life. And therefore to kill a Brute is to deprive him of a Life, or a Remain- *P.* 35.
der of Time, that is equal to little more than nothing: Tho' this may perhaps be

be more applicable to ſome Animals than to others. That which is chiefly to be taken Care of in this Matter, is, that the Brute may not be kill'd unneceſſarily; when it is kill'd, that it may have as few Moments of Pain, as may be; and that no Young be left to languiſh.

II. *Pain conſider'd in it's ſelf is a real Evil, Pleaſure a real Good.*

III. *By the general Idea of Good and Evil,* Pleaſure *is in it's ſelf deſireable,* Pain *to be avoided.*

IV. *Pleaſure compared with Pain may be either equal, or more, or leſs: Alſo Pleaſures may be compared with other Pleaſures, and Pains with Pains.* That this Propoſition is true, appears from the various Purſuits of Men (tho' in ſome particulars they may err, and wrong themſelves, ſome more, ſome leſs;) all tending to gain ſuch Advantages, as they think do exceed all their Trouble; and ſhewing, that Men prefer one Sort of Pleaſure to another, and ſubmit to one Sort of Pain, rather than to have another.

P. 36. V. *When Pleaſures and Pains are equal, they mutually deſtroy each other: When the*

the one exceeds, the Excess gives the true Quantity of Pleasure or Pain.

VI. *As therefore there may be true Pleasure, and Pain; so there may be some Pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into Pain, and ought to be reckoned as Pains*; and on the other Hand *some Pains, that may be annumerated to Pleasures.* Thus the Natures of Pleasures and Pains may be varied, and sometimes transmuted: Which ought never to be forgot. Nor this neither: As in the Sense of most Men, perhaps a *little* Pain will weigh against a *great deal* of Pleasure; so possibly there may be some Pains which exceed all Pleasures, *that is*, such Pains as no Man would chuse to suffer for any Pleasure *whatever*, or at least any that we know of in this World. So that it is possible the Difference, or Excess of Pain, may rise so high as to become immense; and then the Pleasure to be set against that Pain will be but a Point or Cypher, a Quantity of no Value.

VII. *Any Being may be said to be so far happy, as his Pleasures are true.* That P. 37.
cannot be the Happiness of any Being, which is bad for him: Nor can Happiness be disagreeable. It must be some-

thing therefore, that is both *agreeable* and *good* for the Poſſeſſor. Now preſent Pleaſure is for the preſent indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it muſt pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his Good, or good for him: This therefore cannot be his *Happineſs*. Nor, again, can that Pleaſure be reckon'd Happineſs, for which one pays the full Price in Pain: Becauſe theſe are Quantities, which mutually deſtroy each other. But yet ſince Happineſs is ſomething, which by the general Idea of it, muſt be deſireable, and therefore agreeable, it muſt be ſome kind of Pleaſure: And this, from what has been ſaid, can only be ſuch Pleaſure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's Happineſs will be as his true Quantity of Pleaſure. [*That is*, according to what he has of that kind of Pleaſure, which is *true*, clear of all Diſcounts and future Payments, or Abatements in Reſpect of any Pain that may attend or follow it. *Vid. p.* 36.]

As to *mere* Indolence reſulting from Inſenſibility, or join'd with it, it is no more a Happineſs, than it is an Unhappineſs; upon the Confine of both, but neither. A Senſe indeed of being free from Pains and Troubles is attended with Happineſs: But then the Happineſs flows from

from the *Senſe* of the Caſe, and is a *poſitive* Happineſs.

VIII. *That Being may be ſaid to be ultimately happy in ſome Degree or other, the Sum total of whoſe Pleaſures exceeds the Sum of all his Pains:* And ſo on the other ſide, *that Being may be ſaid to be ultimately Unhappy, the Sum of all whoſe Pains exceeds that of all his Pleaſures.* P. 38.

IX. *To make it's ſelf happy is a Duty, which every Being, in Proportion to it's Capacity, owes to itſelf; and that, which every intelligent Being may be ſuppoſed to aim at in general. And therefore,*

X. *We cannot act with Reſpect either to our ſelves, or other Men, according to Truth, unleſs both we and they are conſider'd as Beings ſuſceptive of Happineſs and Unhappineſs, and naturally deſirous of the one and averſe to the other.*

XI. *As the true and ultimate Happineſs of no Being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with Truth, and denies the Natures of Things; ſo neither can the Practice of Truth make any Being ultimately unhappy.* For that which contradicts Nature and Truth, oppoſes the Will of the Author of Nature, which it were abſurd to ſuppoſe can be a Means of Happineſs,

pineſs, unleſs any could be more powerful than he. And it is alſo abſurd to think, that any Man ſhould be finally miſerable, only for *conforming* himſelf to Truth, or the Nature and Conſtitution of things, proceeding from a good as well as powerful Being.

P. 39. XII. *The genuine Happineſs of every Being muſt be ſomething, that is not incompatible with, or deſtructive of it's Nature, or the ſuperior or better Part of it, if it be mix't.* For Inſtance, nothing can be the true Happineſs of a *rational* Being, that is inconſiſtent with *Reaſon.* If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational Being, which is not agreeable to Reaſon, it is plain his Reaſon is loſt, his Nature depreſt, and that he now liſts himſelf among *Irrationals*, at leaſt as to that particular.

P. 40. XIII. *Thoſe Pleaſures are true, and to be reckon'd into our Happineſs, againſt which there lies no Reaſon.* For then there is always a Reaſon for it, included in the Term. So when there is no Reaſon for undergoing Pain (or venturing it) there is one againſt it.

XIV. To conclude this Section, *The Way to Happineſs and the Practice of Truth incur the one into the other.* As no Being

can be truly and ultimately happy, as has been before obſerv'd, by means of any thing that is contrary to Truth; ſo whatever produces Happineſs, muſt be ſomething which is conſiſtent and *co-incident* with it.

Two Things then which are to be religiouſly regarded in all our Conduct, are *Truth* and *Happineſs*, *that is*, ſuch Pleaſures, as accompany or follow the Practice of Truth, or are not inconſiſtent with it.

SECT. III.

Of Reaſon, *and the* Ways *of diſcovering Truth.*

IN the next Place it is proper to ſay ſomething concerning the Means of knowing what is *true*. P. 41.

I. *If a Propoſition be true, it is always ſo in all the Inſtances and Uſes, to which it is applicable.* For otherwiſe it muſt be both true and falſe. Therefore, P. 43.

II. *By the help of Truths already known more may be diſcovered.* For 1. Thoſe

Inferences which ariſe *preſently* from the Application of general Truths, to the particular Things and Caſes contain'd under them, muſt be juſt. As for Example; *the Whole is bigger than a Part: Therefore* A (ſome particular thing) *is more than half* A. For it is plain that *A* is contain'd in the *Idea* of Whole, as Half *A* is in that of Part. So that if the antecedent Propoſition be true, the Conſequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and muſt alſo be true. 2.

P. 41. All thoſe *Concluſions*, which are derived thro' mean Propoſitions that are true, and by juſt Inferences, will be as true as thoſe, from which they are deriv'd. The Meaning is this: Every juſt Conſequence is *founded in ſome known Truth*, by Virtue of which one Thing follows from another, after the Manner of Steps in an *Algebraick* Operation: And if Inferences are ſo founded, and juſt, the things inferred muſt be true, if they are made from true Premiſes. And if the laſt, and all the intermediate Inferences be as right, as the firſt is ſuppoſed to be, it is no Matter to what length the Proceſs is carried. All the Parts of it being locked together by Truth, the laſt Reſult is derived thro' ſuch a Succeſſion of mean Propoſitions, as render it's Title to our Aſſent not worſe by being long.

III. *Rea-*

III. *Reaſon is a Faculty of making ſuch Inferences and Concluſions, as were mention'd under the preceding Propoſition, from any thing known or given.* P. 45.

IV. *There is ſuch a thing as right Reaſon:* Or *Truth may be diſcovered by Reaſoning.* The Word *Reaſon* has ſeveral Acceptations, *ſometimes* it is us'd for that Power mention'd in the laſt Propoſition, as when we ſay, *Man is a being indued with Reaſon.* And then the Senſe of the Propoſition muſt be this: That there is ſuch a Uſe to be made of this Power as is right, and will manifeſt Truth. *Sometimes* it ſeems to be taken for thoſe general Truths, of which the Mind poſſeſſes it's ſelf from the intimate Knowledge of it's own Ideas, and by which it is govern'd in it's Inferences and Concluſions; as when we ſay, *ſuch a thing is agreeable to Reaſon:* For that is as much as to ſay, it is agreeable to the ſaid general Truths, and that authentick Way of making Deductions, which is founded in them. And then the Senſe of this Propoſition is, that there are ſuch general Truths, and ſuch a right Way of inferring. Again; ſometimes it ſeems to ſtand only for ſome particular Truth, as it is apprehended by the Mind with the Cauſes of it, or the Manner of it's Derivation from other Truths: *That is,* it P. 48.

differs not from Truth except in this one Reſpect, that it is conſidered not barely in it's ſelf, but as the Effect or Reſult of a Proceſs of reaſoning: Or it is Truth with the Arguments for our Aſſent, and it's Evidence about it; as when it is ſaid, *that ſuch or ſuch an Aſſertion is Reaſon.* And then the Senſe of the Propoſition is, that there are Truths ſo to be apprehended by the Mind. So all comes to this at laſt: Truth (or there are Truths, which) may be diſcovered, or found to be ſuch, *by reaſoning.*

If it were not ſo, our rational Faculties, the nobleſt we have, would be vain. *Beſides,* that it is ſo, appears from what we know within our ſelves. Not but that Error too often happens thro' various Cauſes, in Oppoſition to which we are oblig'd to ſay *right Reaſon* inſtead of *Reaſon* only. Nor is Truth to be diſcovered in *every* Caſe: That would imply an Extent of Knowledge, which we cannot pretend to.

P. 49.
P. 50.

V. *To act according to right Reaſon, and to act according to Truth are in Effect the ſame thing.* For in which Senſe ſoever the Word *Reaſon* is taken, it will ſtand either for Truth it's ſelf, or for that, which is inſtrumental in diſcovering and proving it to be ſuch: And then with Reſpect to this latter Senſe, whoever is guided

guided by that Faculty, whoſe Office conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing and pointing out Truth, muſt be a Follower of Truth, and act agreeably to it.

VI. *To be govern'd by Reaſon is the general Law impos'd by the Author of Nature upon them, whoſe uppermoſt Faculty is Reaſon: As the Dictates of it in particular Caſes are the particular Laws to which they are ſubject.* If Reaſon be the *uppermoſt* Faculty, it has a Right to controll the reſt by being *ſuch.* And it is plain, that Reaſon is of a commanding Nature. It injoins this, condemns that, only allows ſome other things, and will be paramount, if it is at all. Now a Being, who has ſuch a determining and governing Power, ſo plac'd in his Nature, as to be eſſential to him, is a Being certainly fram'd to be govern'd by that Power. P. 51.

VII. *If a rational Being, as ſuch, is under an Obligation to obey Reaſon, and this Obedience, or Practice of Reaſon, is in Effect the ſame Thing with the Obſervation of Truth,* it plainly follows, 1. That what is ſaid Sect. I. Prop. IV. muſt be true with Reſpect to ſuch a Being for this farther Cauſe; becauſe to him nothing can be right, that interferes with Reaſon; and nothing can interfere with Truth, but it muſt interfere with Reaſon: P. 52.

For

For whatever is known to be true, Reaſon either finds it, or allows it to be ſuch. 2. That there is to a rational Being ſuch a thing as *Religion*, which may alſo upon this farther Account be properly called *natural*. For certainly to obey the Law, which the Author of his Being has given him, is Religion: And to obey the Law which he has given or revealed to him by making it to reſult from the right Uſe of his own natural Faculties, muſt be to him his *natural Religion*. 3. A careful Obſervation of Truth, the Way to Happineſs, and the Practice of Reaſon, are in the Iſſue the ſame thing. For of the two laſt, each falls in with the firſt, and therefore each with other. And ſo at laſt, natural Religion is grounded upon this tripple and ſtrict Union of *Truth*, *Happineſs*, and *Reaſon*: And it's trueſt Definition is, *the Purſuit of Happineſs by the Practice of Reaſon and Truth.*

Let it be here by the Way obſerv'd, that in judging of Right and Truth, every one muſt judge for himſelf. For ſince all reaſoning is founded originally in the Knowledge of one's own private *Ideas*, by Virtue of which he becomes conſcious of ſome firſt Truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his Steps in his Purſuits after more Truths, *&c.* the *Criterion*, or that by which he tries his own Reaſonings, and

knows them to be right, muſt be the *internal* Evidence he has already of certain Truths, and the Agreeableneſs of his Inferences to them. Therefore to demand another Man's Aſſent to any Thing without conveying into his Mind ſuch Reaſons, as may produce a Senſe of the Truth of it, is to erect a Tyranny over his Underſtanding, and to demand a Tribute which it is *not poſſible* for him to pay. It is true Men may be *aſſiſted* in making their Judgment of Things; but it is in order to produce ſuch a Light in them, that by it *they* may ſee and judge for themſelves; and find the Reaſonableneſs of the Opinion propos'd to them *within themſelves.* Not that Men muſt in all Caſes *act* according to their private and ſingle Judgments. In Reſpect of ſuch Things, as concern themſelves *only*, or ſuch as are left open to every Man's own Senſe, they may and ought; only preſerving a due Deference to them who differ from them, and are known upon other Occaſions to have more Knowledge and Literature than themſelves: But when a Society is concern'd, and hath determin'd any Thing, it may be conſider'd as one Perſon, of which he, who diſſents from the reſt, is only perhaps a ſmall Particle; and then his Judgment will be in a Manner abſorbed in that of the Majority, p. 53.

rity, or of them to whom the Power of judging is intruſted. *Vid. p.* 178.

VIII. *The Reports of Senſe are not of equal Authority with the clear Determinations of Reaſon, when they happen to differ.* For no Man doth or can pretend to believe his Senſes, when he has a Reaſon againſt it. Which is an irrefragable Proof that Reaſon is above Senſe and controlls it. But,

P. 55.

IX. *The Reports of Senſe may be taken for true, when there is no Reaſon againſt it.* Becauſe when there is *no* Reaſon *not* to believe, that alone is a Reaſon for believing them. And therefore,

X. *In this Caſe to act according to them, is to act according to Reaſon, and the great Law of our Nature.*

Thus there are *two* Ways, by which we may aſſure our ſelves of the Truth of *many* Things; or at leaſt may attain ſuch a Degree of Certainty, as will be ſufficient to determine our *Practice*, by *Reaſon*, and by *Senſe under the Government of Reaſon*; that is, when Reaſon ſupports it, or at leaſt doth not oppoſe it. By the former we diſcover ſpeculative Truths; by the latter, or both together Matters of Fact.

XI. When

XI. *When Certainty is not to be had, it muſt be conſider'd, which ſide of the Queſtion is the more probable.* Probability will generally ſhew it's ſelf upon the Application of theſe and ſuch like Rules. 1. That may be reckon'd probable, which, in the Eſtimation of Reaſon, appears to be more agreeable to the *Conſtitution* of Nature. If a Parent educates his Child virtuouſly, he will be more likely to do well, than if he was left to himſelf to be carried away by his own Paſſions, or the Influence of thoſe, into whoſe Hands he might fall, the Bias of the former lying towards Vice and Miſery in the End, and the Plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. 2. When any *Obſervation* hath hitherto *conſtantly* held true, or *moſt commonly* proved to be ſo, it has by this acquired an eſtabliſh'd Credit; the Cauſe may be preſumed to reſtrain it's former Force, and the Effect may be taken as probable, if in the Caſe before us there doth not appear ſome Reaſon for Exception. There is no demonſtrative Argument to prove, that any particular Man will die: But yet he muſt be more than mad, who can preſume upon Immortality here, when he finds ſo many Generations all gone to a Man, and the ſame *Enemies* that have laid them proſtrate, ſtill purſuing their Victories. 3. When

P. 56.

P. 57.

When neither Nature nor other Obſervations point out the probable Conjecture to us, we muſt be determin'd (if we need be determined at all) by the Reports and Senſe of them, whom we
P. 58. apprehend, judging with the beſt Skill we have, * to be moſt *knowing* and *honeſt*. Of all the Rules the *firſt* deſerves the principal Regard: The other two are of Uſe, when Nature ſo utterly excludes us from her Boſom, that no Opportunity is allow'd of making a Judgment. *Laſtly*, when Nature, the frequent Repetition of the ſame Event, and the Opinion of the beſt Judges concur to make any thing probable, it is ſo in the higheſt Degree.

P. 59. To conclude; that we ought to follow *Probability*, when Certainty leaves us, is plain: Becauſe then it becomes the *only* Light we have. For unleſs it is better to wander and fluctuate in *abſolute* Uncertainty than to follow ſuch a Guide, it muſt be reaſonable to direct our Steps

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* *Non Numero hæc judicantur, ſed Pondere*, as *Tully* ſpeaks. Therefore I cannot without a Degree of Indignation find a Sort of Writers pleaſing themſelves with having diſcovered unciviliz'd Nations, which have little or no Knowledge of the Deity, *&c.* And then applying their Obſervations to the Service of Atheiſm. As if Ignorance could prove any thing, or alter it's Nature by being general.

by

by Probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reaſonable, we are oblig'd to do it by Prop. VI. P. 59.

As to the principal Cauſes of *Error*, they are ſuch as theſe. 1. Want of *Faculties*; when Men pretend to judge of Things above them. As ſome aſſert what they have no Reaſon to aſſert; ſo others deny what there is the higheſt Reaſon to believe, only becauſe they cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of proper Qualifications; as when illiterate People invade the Provinces of Scholars, *&c.* P. 60. 3. The ſtrength of Appetites, Paſſions, Prejudices. Among other Prejudices, there is one of a particular Nature, which may be obſerv'd to be one of the *greateſt* Cauſes of modern Irreligion. Whilſt ſome Opinions and Rites are carried to an abſurd Height, even Men of common Senſe many times ſee thro' them; and then out of an exceſſive Renitence, not ſeparating that which is true from that which is falſe, they fall into the contrary Extreme, a Contempt of all Religion in general. The Sum of all in a few Words is this: Many Qualifications are requiſite in order to judge of ſome Truths, and particularly thoſe which are of greateſt Importance: Proper Learning and Penetration, Vacancy from Buſineſs, a Detachment from the P. 62.

Intereſt

Intereſt of all Parties, much Sincerity and a perfect *Reſignation* to the Government of Reaſon and Force of Truth; which are things not to be reconcil'd with the uſual Ignorance, Paſſions, tumultuary Lives, and other Circumſtances which carry moſt Men tranſverſe.

SECT. IV.

Of the Obligations *of imperfect Beings with Reſpect to their* Power of acting.

THIS Queſtion is alſo proper to be conſider'd, *viz. If a Man can find out Truth; may he not want the Power of acting agreeably to it?* On which let theſe things be obſerv'd. P. 62.

I. *So far as any Being has no Power, or Opportunity of doing any thing, ſo far is that Being incapable of any Obligation of doing it. It is a Truth confeſs'd by all, that no Body is oblig'd to Impoſſibilities.* From hence it follows,

II. *That*

II. *That the Obligations of Beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their Faculties, Powers, Opportunities: And not more.* P. 63.

III. *To endeavour,* (or to do what one can) *may fitly express the Use of all the Opportunities and Powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect Being hath to act*; and *the Obligations of such Beings reach, as far as their Endeavours may.* From whence it follows in the last place.

IV. *That they who are capable of discerning Truth, tho' not all Truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho' not always or in all Cases, are nevertheless oblig'd to do these, as far as they are able.* Or, it is *the Duty of such a Being sincerely to* endeavour *to practise* Reason; *not to contradict any* Truth, *by Word or Deed*; *and in short, to treat every thing as being* what it is.

Thus the general Duties of rational Beings, mention'd in or resulting from the preceding Sections, are brought together and *finally* fixt under the *Correction* or *Limitation* in this last Proposition. This is the Sum of their Religion, from which no Exemption or Excuse lies. Every one can endeavour, every one can do what he can; but in order to that every one ought to be in *earnest*, and to exert himself *heartily*, not stifling his own

Conſcience; not diſſembling, ſuppreſſing or neglecting his own Powers. I
P. 64. am perſuaded, if Men would be ſerious, and put forth themſelves, they would find by Experience, that *much* is left to their own Conduct. Up and try.

SECT. V.

Truths relating to the Deity. *Of his Exiſtence, Perfection, Providence,* &c.

P. 65. IT has been ſhewn in the former Sections in what the Nature of *moral Good and Evil* conſiſts, *viz.* a Conformity or Diſagreement to *Truth*, and thoſe Things which are co-incident with it, *Reaſon* and *Happineſs*; alſo how Truth is diſcover'd, by *Senſe* or *Reaſon*, or both. It is now proper to ſpecify ſome of thoſe *Truths*, which are of the greateſt Importance and Influence. They reſpect principally either the *Deity*, *ourſelves*, or the *reſt of Mankind*. The firſt are the Subject of *this* Section.

I. *When there is a Series of Cauſes and Effects, there muſt neceſſarily be a Cauſe in Nature prior to the reſt, uncauſed*; or *there*

there muſt be ſome independent Being, upon whom it doth originally depend.

If *Z* (ſome body) be put into Motion by *Y*, *Y* by *X*, and *X* by *W*, it is plain that *X* moves *Y*, and *Y* moves *Z* only as they are firſt moved, *X* by *W*, and *Y* by *X*; that *Z*, *Y*, *X* are moved, or rather *Z* more *Y* more *X*, that is, added one to the other, and ſo taken together, are *one moved*; that *W* ſtands here as the firſt Mover, or Author of the Motion, unmov'd by any other; and therefore without *W* there would be a *Moved* without a *Mover*, which is abſurd; and laſtly, that of what Length ſoever the *Series* may be, the Caſe will be ever the ſame, *that is*, if there be no *firſt Mover* unmoved, there muſt be a *Moved* without a *Mover*.

The Reaſoning is the ſame in reſpect of a Series of Cauſes and Effects: For without a ſupreme Cauſe, depending upon nothing, and on which the reſt depend, the whole will be an Effect without an Efficient, or a Dependent without anything to depend upon; that is, *dependent, and not dependent*. Even if the *Series* be ſuppoſed to aſcend infinitely (though that it ſelf is perhaps an abſurd Suppoſition, ſee the Notes, *p.* 66.) yet it will ſtill be but an infinite *Series*, or Succeſſion of Effects, which will not leſs than a finite *Series*, *require* a Cauſe without *P.* 66.

without it's ſelf, but *infinitely more.* An
P. 67. *infinite* Succeſſion of Effects will require an *infinite* Efficient, or a Cauſe *infinitely effective*; ſo far is it from requiring none.

Suppoſe a *Chain* hung down out of the Heavens from an *unknown* Height, and though every Link of it gravitated towards the Earth, and what it hung upon was not viſible, yet it did not deſcend, but kept it's Situation; and upon this a Queſtion ſhould ariſe, *what ſupported or kept up this Chain?* Would it be a ſufficient Anſwer to ſay, that the *firſt* (or loweſt) Link hung upon the *ſecond*, (or that next above it) the *ſecond* or rather the *firſt and ſecond together* upon the *third*, and ſo on *ad infinitum?* For what holds up the whole? A *Chain* of *ten* Links would fall down, unleſs ſomething able to bear it hinder'd; one of *twenty*, if not ſtaid by ſomething of a yet greater Strength, in Proportion to the Increaſe of Weight; and therefore one of *infinite* Links certainly, if not ſuſtain'd by ſomething *infinitely* ſtrong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight. And thus it is in a *Chain* of Cauſes and Effects tending, or as it were *gravitating* towards ſome End. The laſt (or loweſt) depends or (as one may ſay) is *ſuſpended* upon the Cauſe above it; this again, if it be not the firſt Cauſe, is ſuſpended as an Effect upon ſomething above it, *&c.* And if

they ſhould be infinite, unleſs (agreeably to what has been ſaid) there is ſome *Cauſe* upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite Effect without an Efficient; and to aſſert there is any ſuch thing, would be as great an *Abſurdity*, as to ſay, that a finite or *little* Weight wants ſomething to ſuſtain it, but an infinite one or the *greateſt* does not. P. 68.

II. *A Cauſe or Being, that has no ſuperior Cauſe, and therefore is unproduc'd, and independent, muſt be Self-exiſtent*; that is, *ſuch is his Nature, that he cannot but be.* The Root of his Exiſtence (in that he is *independent* and *uncaus'd*) can be ſought for no where, but in his own Nature.

III. *There muſt be ſuch a Being.* That Series of Cauſes and Effects which we know is in the World proves it, from what has been already ſaid: Beſides, otherwiſe nothing could be at all. For the *Univerſe* could not *produce it's ſelf*, nor could any *Part* of it produce it's ſelf, and then produce the reſt; becauſe this is ſuppoſing a Thing to *act* before *it is.*

IV. *Such a Being muſt be not only eternal, but infinite. Eternal* he muſt be, becauſe there is no Way by which ſuch a Being can either begin, or ceaſe to be, P. 69.

Exiſtence being of his Eſſence; that is, as was before mention'd, ſuch is his Nature, that he cannot but be: And *infinite* he muſt be, becauſe he can be limited by no other as to his Exiſtence. For if there was any Being able to limit him, he muſt be *inferior* to that Being, and in that Caſe *dependent*. Beſide, if his *Preſence* was any where excluded, he would not be *there*; and if *not there*, he might be ſuppos'd to be *not elſewhere*; and thus he might be ſuppos'd *not to be at all*. But ſuch a Being, as is deſcrib'd in the ſecond Prop. cannot ſo much as be ſuppos'd *not to be*, [in that Exiſtence is eſſential to him; or his Nature is ſuch, that he cannot but be.]

V. *Such a Being is above all Things, that fall under our Cognizance; and therefore his Manner of Exiſtence is above all our Conceptions.* For he is a *neceſſary* Exiſtent, [that is, he cannot but be;] but nothing within our Comprehenſion is of this Kind. And adequate Ideas of Eternity and Infinity are above us, as
P. 70. Finites. Yet we may be ſure that

VI. *He exiſts in a Manner, which is perfect.* For he, who exiſts of himſelf, and is the Fountain of Exiſtence to other Beings, muſt exiſt in the *uppermoſt* and *beſt* Manner of exiſting. And (ſince he

is *infinite* and *illimited)* he muſt exiſt in the beſt Manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exiſt thus, is infinite Goodneſs of Exiſtence; and to exiſt in a Manner *infinitely good*, is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but one ſuch Being.* Becauſe his Manner of Exiſtence being perfect and *illimited*, that Manner of being (if it may be ſo expreſs'd) is *exhauſted* by him, or belongs ſolely to him. If any other could partake with him in it, he muſt want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited incloſe all. [Briefly thus: There cannot be two different infinite, or abſolutely perfect Beings. For wherein they were different, one would want ſomewhat that the other had, which is not to be abſolutely perfect.] This is ſufficient to ruin the *Manichean* Cauſe, and exclude the *independent Principle* of *Evil*. For if we cannot account for the Exiſtence of that Evil, which we find by Experience to be in the World, it is but one Inſtance out of many of our Ignorance. There may be Reaſons for it, tho' we do not know them: And ſome things may be ſaid on this Subject, which deſerve our Attention. For as to *moral* Good and Evil, they ſeem to depend upon our ſelves. If we do but endeavour the *moſt* we can, to do what we ought,

P. 71.

we ſhall not be guilty of *not doing* it. And therefore it is our Fault, and not to be charg'd upon any other Being, if Guilt and *Evil* be introduc'd by our Neglect or Abuſe of our own Liberty and Powers. Then as to *Phyſical* Evil, without it much *Phyſical* Good would be loſt, the one neceſſarily inferring the other *. And if there is a future State, that which ſeems wrong *now*, may be rectify'd hereafter. Moreover, if this World be deſign'd for a *Palæſtra*, where Men are to exerciſe their Faculties and their Virtues, and by that *prepare* themſelves for a ſuperior State, (and who can ſay it is not?) there muſt be *Difficulties* and *Temptations*, Occaſions and Opportunities for this Exerciſe. Laſtly, if there are Evils, of which Men know not the true Origin; yet if they would but ſeriouſly reflect upon the many Marks of *Reaſon*, *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs* every where to be obſerv'd in Inſtances, which they *do* or may underſtand, they could ſcarce doubt but the ſame Things prevail'd in thoſe, which they *do not* underſtand. But to return,

P. 72.

* *For Inſtance, if there was no ſuch Thing as* Poverty, *there could be no* Riches, *or no great Benefit by them. There would ſcarce be any Arts or Sciences*, &c. Notes, *p.* 71.

VIII. *All*

VIII. *All other Beings depend upon this one ſupreme Being for their Exiſtence:* For being imperfect and dependent, and there being nothing elſe but the one perfect and independent Being, upon which they can *ultimately* depend, upon him they *muſt* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of Nature; nor can any Thing be, or be done, but what he either cauſes (immediately or mediately) or permits.* For upon whom depends the Exiſtence of all Beings, upon him alſo muſt depend the intrinſic Manner of their Exiſtence, or the *Natures* of theſe Beings: And again, upon whom depend their Being and Nature, *p.* 73. upon him depend the *neceſſary Effects* and *Conſequences* of their Being, and being ſuch as they are in themſelves. Then, as to the *Acts* of *free Agents*, and the Effects of them, he is indeed not the *Author* of thoſe, becauſe they proceed from Agents, who have no Neceſſity impos'd upon them by him to act either this or that Way. But yet however theſe *free Agents* muſt depend upon him *as ſuch*, from him they derive their Power of acting; and it is he, who permits them to uſe their Liberty: Tho' many Times through their own Fault they uſe it amiſs. And laſtly, as to the

Nature

Nature of thoſe *Relations*, which lie between Ideas or Things really *exiſting*, or which ariſe from Facts already *done and paſt*, theſe reſult from the Natures of the *Things* themſelves; all which the ſupreme Being either cauſes or permits (as before).

From hence it now appears, that whatever expreſſes the Exiſtences or Non-exiſtences of Things, and their mutual Relations *as they are*, is true by the *Conſtitution* of Nature: And if ſo, it muſt be alſo agreeable to his Will, who is at the Head of it. And thus thoſe Arguments in Sect. I. Prop. 4. which turn'd only upon a *Suppoſition* that there was ſuch a Being, are here *confirm'd* and *made abſolute*.

P. 73. X. *The one ſupreme and perfect Being, upon whom the Exiſtence of all other Beings, and their Powers originally depend, is that Being, whom we mean by the Word GOD.*

P. 74. XI. *God cannot be corporeal.* There are many Things in *Matter* utterly inconſiſtent with the Nature of ſuch a Being, as it has been demonſtrated God muſt be. Particularly *Matter* is incapable of *acting*, *paſſive* only and *ſtupid*; which are Defects that can never be aſcribed to him who is the firſt Cauſe or prime

prime Agent, the ſupreme Intellect, and altogether perfect.

XII. *Neither infinite Space, nor infinite Duration, nor Matter infinitely extended, or eternally exiſting, nor any, nor all of theſe taken together, can be God.* For each of theſe by themſelves are utterly incapable of divine Perfection. And if the *Univerſe*, or Sum total of finite Beings, were God, then *every Thing* is Divine, *every Thing* God, or of God: And ſo *all* Things together muſt make but one Being. But on the contrary we ſee, there are many diſtinct Beings, and ſeparable one from the other, and independent each of other. In ſhort, no *Collection* of Beings, can be *one* Being, and therefore not God; [much leſs can a Collection of imperfect and finite Beings, make up a perfect and infinite one.] P. 75. P. 76.

XIII. *It is ſo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no ſuch Thing as either Matter or Motion without him.* This muſt be true of *Matter*, becauſe it has been prov'd already, that there can be *but one* independent Being; that he is *incorporeal*, and that the Exiſtence of all other Beings muſt *depend upon him.* It is to no Purpoſe to object, that one cannot *conceive* how P. 77.

the

the Exiſtence of Matter can be deriv'd from another Being. For God being *above our Conceptions*, the Manner of his Operations, and in which Things depend upon him, muſt alſo be to us *inconceivable*. Reaſon diſcovers that this viſible World muſt owe it's Exiſtence to ſome inviſible almighty Being; that is, it diſcovers this to be Fact; and we muſt not deny Facts, becauſe we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our Faculties diſcover to us the Exiſtence of Things, and then drop us in the Enquiry *how* they are. As for *Motion*, if Matter it's ſelf could not be without ſuch a Cauſe, it is certain, *Motion*, which is an Affection of Matter, could never be. Beſides, there could be no *Motion*, unleſs either there be in Matter it's ſelf a Power of *beginning* it, or unleſs it is communicated from Body to Body in an *infinite Succeſſion*, or in a *Circle*, and ſo has no Beginning; or elſe is *produc'd* by ſome incorporeal Being, or Beings. Now as hardy as Men are in advancing Opinions that favour their Vices, though never ſo repugnant to Reaſon, it can hardly be believed any one will aſſert, that a Particle of *mere Matter* (let it be great or ſmall, of any Figure whatſoever, *&c.*) left altogether to it's ſelf, could ever of it's ſelf *begin* to move. To be ſhort, a

Power

Power of beginning Motion is not in the Idea of Matter: Nor is there any Thing in all Phyſicks better ſettled than that which is called *Vis Inertiæ*, or *Inertia* of Matter. P. 78.

The Propagation of Motion from Body to Body, *without any firſt Mover*, or immaterial Cauſe of Motion, has been proved impoſſible, Prop. I.

The Suppoſition of a perpetual Motion in a *Circle*, is begging the Queſtion. For if *A* moves *B*, *B* moves *C*, and ſo on to *Z*, and then *Z* moves *A*; this is the ſame as to ſay, that *A* moves *A*, by the Intervention of *B*, *C*, *D*, --- *Z*: That is, *A moves it's ſelf*, or can *begin* Motion.

It remains then that all corporeal Motions come originally from ſome Mover *incorporeal*; which muſt be either that ſupreme and ſelf-exiſting *Spirit* himſelf, who is God; or ſuch as will put us in the Way how to find, that there is ſuch a Being, *vid. p.* 65. Hence there is not the *leaſt Particle* of Matter, that does not carry with it an Argument of God's Exiſtence; not the ſlighteſt Motion produc'd, the leaſt *Whiſper* of the Air, but tells it. P. 79.

XIV. *The Frame and Conſtitution of the World, the aſtoniſhing Magnificence of it, the various Appearances and Kinds of Beings, the Uniformity obſerv'd in the Productions of Things, the Uſes and Ends for which*

which they ſerve, &c. *do all ſhew that there is ſome Almighty Deſigner, an infi-*
P. 80. *nite Wiſdom and Power at the Top of all theſe Things: Such Marks there are of both:* Or, *God is that Being, without whom ſuch a Frame or Conſtitution of the World, ſuch a Magnificence in it*, &c. *could not be.*

In Order to prove to any one the *Grandneſs* of this Fabrick of the World, one needs only to bid him conſider the *Sun*, with that inſupportable Glory and Luſtre that ſurrounds it, and in a Word, the Magnificence and immenſe Expanſe of the *Heavens*; in which, if we could take a View of all the *Particulars*, how would Wonders multiply upon us? If we look upon this *our Seat* (the Earth)
P. 81. what Scope is here for Admiration? The great *Variety* of Mountains, Hills, Valleys, Plains, Rivers, Seas, Trees, Plants! The many Tribes of different *Animals*, with which it is ſtocked! The multifarious *Inventions* and *Works* of one of theſe; that is, of us *Men*, &c. And yet when all theſe (Heaven and Earth) are ſurvey'd as *nicely* as they can be by the Help of our unaſſiſted Senſes, and even of teleſcopical Glaſſes, by the Aſſiſtance of good *Microſcopes* in very *ſmall* Parts of Matter, as many *new* Wonders may perhaps be diſcovered, as thoſe already obſerved; new *Kingdoms* of Animals,

mals, new *Architecture* and Curioſity of Work.

And this mighty Building is not only thus grand, and the Appearances ſtupendous in it, but the *Manner* in which Things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their Cauſes *too profound* for us. It is impoſſible for us to come at the true *Principles* of Things, or to ſee into the Œconomy of the *fineſt* Part of Nature and Workings of the firſt Springs. The Cauſes that appear to us are but the *Effects* of other Cauſes; and as to the *Subſtances* of Things, and their *internal Conſtitution*, they are hid from our Eyes. Our Philoſophy dwells in the Surface of Nature. P. 82.

However, it appears plainly enough in the Parts and Model of the World, that there is a *Contrivance* and a Reſpect to certain Reaſons and *Ends*. And ſince we cannot ſuppoſe the *Parts* of Matter to have *contrived* this wonderful Form of a World among themſelves, and then by Agreement to have taken their reſpective Poſts, and purſued conſtant *Ends* by certain Methods and Meaſures *concerted* (becauſe theſe are Acts, of which they are not capable) there muſt be ſome other Being, whoſe Wiſdom and Power are equal to ſuch a mighty Work, as is the Structure and Preſervation of the World. There muſt be ſome P. 83.

Almighty

Almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the Cauſes of Things ſo deep; preſcribes them ſuch uniform and ſteddy Laws; deſtines and adapts them to certain Purpoſes; and makes one Thing to fit and anſwer to another. That *ſuch* a beautiful Scheme, *ſuch* a juſt Arrangement of Things, compoſed of *innumerable* Parts, and placed as the Offices and Uſes and Wants of the ſeveral Beings *require*, through ſuch an *immenſe* Extent, ſhould be the Effect of *Chance* only, is a Conceit ſo prodigiouſly abſurd, that certainly no one can eſpouſe it heartily, who underſtands the Meaning of that Word. It ſeems to be only a Term by which we expreſs our *Ignorance* of the Cauſe of any Thing; whatever Events or Effects there are, they muſt proceed from ſome Agent or Cauſe, which is either *free* or not *free* (that is, *neceſſary*). If it be free, it wills what it produces; and therefore that which is produced, is produced with *Deſign*, not by Chance. If it acts neceſſarily, the Event muſt *neceſſarily* be, and therefore it is not by Accident. For that which is by Accident or Chance only, might not have been; or it is an Accident only that it is. There can be therefore
P. 84. *no ſuch Cauſe* as Chance. In a Word, he muſt be little acquainted with the Works of Nature, who is not ſenſible how

how delicate and fine they are; and the *finer* they are, the *groſſer* were thoſe of *Epicurus.*

If it ſhould be objected that many Things ſeem to be *uſeleſs*, many Births are *monſtrous*, or the like; ſuch Anſwers as theſe may be made. Things have not therefore no Uſes, becauſe they are conceal'd from us; nor is *Nature* irregular, becauſe there are ſome *ſeeming* Deviations from the common Rule. If the Caſe could be *truly* put, it would no Doubt appear, that Nature proceeds as *regularly* when a *Monſter* is produced, as when the uſual Iſſue in common Caſes. Under theſe Circumſtances the Monſter is the *genuine* Iſſue; that is, in the ſame Circumſtances there would always be the ſame Kind of Production. P. 85.

They who content themſelves with Words, may aſcribe the Formation of the World to *Fate*, or *Nature*, as well as to *Chance.* And yet *Fate* is nothing but a *Series* of Events, conſider'd as neceſſarily following in ſome certain Order; which Words declare nothing concerning the *Cauſe* of that Concatenation of Events, or why it is. Time, Place, Manner, Neceſſity, are but *Circumſtances* of Things that come to paſs; not Cauſes of their Exiſtence, or of their being as they are; on the contrary, ſome external and ſuperior Cauſe muſt

be ſuppos'd to put the *Series* in Motion, to project the Order, to connect the Cauſes and Effects, and to *impoſe* the Neceſſity.

P. 86. Then for *Nature*. 1. If it be uſed for the *natural* Conſtitution, Make, or Diſpoſition of Things, in Oppoſition to what is *acquir'd*; then to ſay that *Nature* form'd any Thing, is to ſay that it form'd it's ſelf, or that the *Effect* is the Efficient. 2. If it be uſed for the *Ideas* of Things, what they are in themſelves, and what in their Circumſtances, Cauſes, Conſequences, Reſpects; (as when we ſay the *Nature* of Juſtice requires this or that) then none of theſe Senſes can do an Atheiſt any Service. 3. If it be us'd for the *World*, then it ſtands for *that very Thing*, the Architect of which is the Subject of our Enquiry; and therefore cannot be the Architect it's ſelf. 4. If it ſignifies the *Laws* of the World, by which it is govern'd, and the *Phænomena* in it produc'd, then *Laws* ſuppoſe ſome Legiſlator, and are poſterior to that of which they are Laws.

P. 87. Laſtly, if it denotes the *Author of Nature*, or God, then to *him* it is that the Formation of the World, *&c.* is here aſcrib'd. To all which let it be ſubjoin'd, that there is an unaccountable *Liberty* taken in the Uſe of this Word: And that frequently it is us'd merely as

a *Word*, and nothing more; they who uſe it not knowing themſelves what they mean by it. However, in *no Senſe* can it ſuperſede the being of a Deity.

XV. *Life, Senſe, Cogitation, and the Faculties of our own Minds, ſhew the Exiſtence of ſome ſuperior Being, from whom they are deriv'd.* Matter of it's ſelf is not capable of theſe Powers; and our *Souls* being not ſelf-exiſtent or independent, we muſt be indebted for them to ſome great Benefactor, who is the *Fountain* of all our Powers. It is in vain to ſay that the *Soul*, together with Life, Senſe, *&c.* are propagated by *Traduction* from Parents to Children, from Eternity: For if ſuch a Traduction were poſſible, yet to ſuppoſe this without any farther Account of the Original of Mankind or taking in any Author of this traductive Power, is the ſame as to ſuppoſe an infinite Series of *Effects* without a *Cauſe*, which has been already ſhewn to be abſurd, Prop. I. *P.* 88.

But as to the Opinion it's ſelf of the *Traduction* of Souls, it ought to be clearly explain'd what is meant by *Tradux Animæ:* For it is not eaſy to conceive how Thought, or thinking Subſtances can be propagated after the Manner of *Branches*, or in any Manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *meta-*

phorical Uſe of that Phraſe. It ſhould be alſo told, whether this Traduction be made from *one* or from *both* the Parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the ſame *Tradux* or Branch muſt always proceed from two Stocks; which is a Thing that has no Parallel in Nature. And yet it might much better be ſuppos'd of Vines, or Plants, than of *thinking* Beings, who are ſimple and uncompounded Subſtances.

P. 89. This Opinion therefore of the *Traduction* of Souls ſtands upon an unſound Foundation. It is chiefly founded on theſe two Things; the *Similitude* there is between the Features, *&c.* of Children, and thoſe of their Parents, and the Difficulty Men find in forming the *Notion of a Spirit*. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other Subſtance but Matter; and that the Soul being ſome merely material Appendix to the Body, or the like, muſt *attend* it, and come along with it from the Parent or Parents. Now the former of theſe is not always true; as it ought to be to make the Argument valid. Beſides, it may not be hard to account for *ſome* Likeneſs without the Help of Traduction. As to the other Thing, *viz.* That the Soul is merely

P. 90. material, or but the Reſult of ſome

Diſpoſition in Matter, it will be refuted hereafter. But this may be premiſed here: Tho' we can have no Image of a Spirit, yet we may have Reaſon to aſſert the Exiſtence of *ſuch* a Subſtance: Becauſe Matter being incapable of Thought, we are under a Neceſſity of confeſſing that there is ſome other Species of Subſtance, and that our Souls are of that Kind, tho' we can draw no Image of it in our own Minds. Nor is it at all ſurprizing that we ſhould not, unleſs the Mind could be the Object of it's ſelf, or as it were the *Object* and *Spectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whoſe Knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himſelf. *P.* 91.

Laſtly, If there is no *Race* of Men that hath been from Eternity, then there is no Man who is not deſcended from two *firſt Parents*; and then their Souls could be traduced from *no other*. And there is no ſuch Race from Eternity, is apparent from the Face of earthly Things, and the *Hiſtory* of Mankind, Arts and Sciences. What is objected againſt this Argument from fanſied *Inundations*, *Conflagrations*, &c. has no Weight. For no *Conflagration*, no *Blood*, no *Deſtruction* can ſerve the Objector's Purpoſe, to reduce Mankind to that State, which, by ancient Memoirs and many undeniable Symptoms, we find *P.* 92.

them to have been in *not many* thouſands of Years ſince: I ſay, no *Deſtruction* can ſerve his Purpoſe, but ſuch an one as makes *thorough* Work, only ſparing two or three Couples, ſtript of every Thing, and the moſt ſtupid and verieſt Blocks to be picked out of the whole Number; natural Fools, or mere *Homines Sylveſtres* would retain Habits, and fall to their old Way of living as ſoon as they had the Opportunity to do it. And ſuppoſe they never ſhould have ſuch an Opportunity; yet neither would *this* ſerve him effectually: Since without ſome *ſupernatural* Power interpoſing, ſuch a Revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked Creatures preſerv'd, nor the Earth reform'd out of it's Aſhes and Ruins after ſuch a Calcination, or Diſſolution, ſuch a *total* Demolition of every Thing. Add to this, that tho' many Inundations, great Earthquakes, Vulcano's and fiery Eruptions have been in particular Countries; yet there is no Memory or Teſtimony of any ſuch Thing, that has been ever *univerſal*, except perhaps of one Deluge: And as to that, if the *Genius* of the Language in which the Relation is
P. 93. deliver'd, and the Manner of writing Hiſtory in it were well underſtood, ſome labour'd Attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And beſide

ſide that, the ſame *Record*, which tells the Thing was, tells alſo how immediately God was concern'd in it; that ſome Perſons actually were ſaved: And that the People who then periſh'd, as as well as they who ſurviv'd, all deſcended from two *firſt Parents*: And if that Authority be a ſufficient Proof of *one* Part of the Relation, it muſt be ſo of the *reſt*.

We may conclude then, that the *human Soul*, with it's Faculties of Cogitation, *&c.* depends upon a *ſuperior* Being. And who can this be, but the *ſupreme* Being, or God?

XVI. *Tho' God's Eſſence and Manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenſible, yet we may ſay with Aſſurance, that he is free from all Defects:* As our Minds are *finite*, they cannot without a Contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. How ſhould we comprehend the Nature of the ſupreme incorporeal Being, or how he exiſts, when we comprehend not the Nature of the moſt *inferior Spirits*, nor have any Conception even of Matter it's ſelf diveſted of it's Accidents? If we cannot turn our ſelves any Way, even in this material World, without being accoſted with ſomething *above* our Underſtanding; how can we ſee through the Myſteries of his Nature, who is the

ſupreme *Cauſe*, ſo far above every Thing that is here.

P. 94. However, we may poſitively affirm, that whatever our own Defects are, there are *none* in God. This needs no Proof, ſince he is a *perfect* Being, as we have already ſeen. From him therefore muſt be remov'd *Want of Life and Activity*, *Ignorance*, *Want of Power*, *acting inconſiſtently with Reaſon and Truth*, and the like. And when we ſpeak of the *internal eſſential Attributes* of God poſitively, as that he is omniſcient, omnipotent, eternal, *&c.* the *Intent* is only to ſay, that there is no Object of Knowledge or Power, which he does not know, or cannot do; that he exiſts without Beginning and End, *&c.* And we may ſpeak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* his Nature. And ſo,

XVII. *We may conſider God, as operating in the Production and Government of the World, and may draw Concluſions from his Works.* Although we comprehend not the Manner of his Exiſtence, nor the *Mode* or Manner, in which the World depends upon him, and he influences and diſpoſes Things; yet if we ſee Things, which we know cannot be ſelf-exiſtent, and obſerve plainly an *Œconomy* and *Deſign* in the Diſpoſition of them, we may juſtly conclude there is *ſome Being*,

Being, upon whom their Exiſtence doth depend, and by whom they are model'd, may call this Being GOD, or the Au- P. 95.
thor and Governor of the World.

XVIII. *God, who gives Exiſtence to the World, does alſo govern it by his Providence.* The World may be ſaid to be ſo *govern'd*, if there are *Laws* and *Proviſions*, (which can come originally from no other Being, but from him who is the *Author of Nature*) by which *natural Cauſes* act, and in general the Conſtitution of Things is preſerv'd, and *particular Caſes* relating to *rational Beings* are taken Care of in ſuch a Manner, as will at laſt beſt agree with *Reaſon*. As to a *general* Providence (whereby the Con- P. 98.
ſtitution of Things both animate and inanimate is preſerv'd) we ſee, or may ſee, *in Fact*, that there is *ſuch* a Providence. The *World* not being left in a State of Confuſion, or as a Chaos, but reduc'd into *Order*, and *methodiz'd* for Ages to come, the ſeveral Species of Beings having their Offices and Provinces *aſſign'd* them; Plants and Animals Subſiſtence *ſet out* for them; and as they go off, Succeſſors *appointed* to relieve them, and carry on the *Scheme*, &c.

The great Difficulty is, how to account for that *Providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which reſpects (principally)

cipally) *particular* Men. For rational Beings and free Agents are capable of doing and deſerving *well*, or *ill*. Hence many and great Differences will ariſe, which will require from a Governor ſuitable Encouragements, or the contrary. Now the *good* or *ill* State of a Man here depend upon many Things, which ſeem to be ſcarce *all capable* of being determin'd by Providence. They depend upon what he does *himſelf*, and what naturally follows from his own Behaviour; upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him at the ſame Time, or reach him afterward; upon the *Courſe* of Nature, which muſt affect him; and, in *fine*, upon many *Incidents*, of which no Account is to be given. Can there then be a particular Providence, a Providence that ſuits the *ſeveral Caſes* and Prayers of Individuals, without a continual *Repetition* of *Miracles*, and Force *frequently* committed upon the Laws of Nature, and the Freedom of intelligent Agents? There may for theſe Reaſons.

P. 99.

1. It ſeems not *impoſſible* that God ſhould know *what is to come:* On the contrary, it is highly reaſonable to think, that he does and muſt know Things *future:* Whatever happens in the World, which does not come immediately from him, muſt either be the effect of *mechanical* Cauſes, or of the Motions of living Beings

ings and free Agents. As to the former, it cannot be *impoſſible* for him, upon whom the Being and Nature of every Thing depends to ſee through the whole *Train* of Cauſes and Effects, and whatever will come to paſs in *that way*; nay, it is *impoſſible* that he ſhould *not* do it. And as to thoſe Things which depend upon the *voluntary* Motions of free Agents, let us conſider what a Sagacity there is in ſome *Men*, even in reſpect of the future Actings of Mankind, how much more remarkable this Penetration is in *ſome* Men, than in *others*: And that if there be any Minds more perfect than the human, (and who can be ſo conceited of himſelf as to queſtion this?) they muſt have it in a ſtill more eminent Degree, *proportionable* to their Natures. In the laſt Place, let us but allow (as we muſt) this Power of diſcerning to be in God *proportionable* to his Nature, and then it becomes *infinite*: And then again, the *future* Actions of free Agents are at once all unlocked, and expoſed to his View. Beſides, ſince the Difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* Matters of Fact may be known, riſes chiefly from this, that we in Reality conſider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our Way* of knowing; it vaniſhes, when we recollect, that they are and muſt be known to God by ſome.

P. 100.

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other Way. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the Object of divine Knowledge, as *preſent* is of ours: Nor can we tell, what Reſpect *paſt*, *preſent*, *to come*, have to the divine Mind, or wherein they differ. In the laſt Place, this Knowledge is not only not *impoſſible*,
P. 102. but the Perfection of the Deity neceſſarily infers, that nothing can be hid from him. For if *Ignorance* be an Imperfection, the Ignorance of *future* Acts and Events muſt be ſo. There is indeed a common Prejudice againſt the *Preſcience* (as it is uſually called) of God; which ſuggeſts, that if God foreknows Things, then they are *certain*, and no longer Matter of *Freedom:* But *ſure* the Nature of a Thing is not *chang'd* by being known, or known beforehand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not alter'd by this. The Truth is, God foreſees, or rather ſees the Actions of free Agents, becauſe they *will be*; not that they will be, becauſe he foreſees them.

P. 103. 2. It is not impoſſible, that ſuch a *Series* of Cauſes and Effects may be originally deſign'd, that not only general Proviſions may be made for the ſeveral Species of Beings, but even *particular Caſes*, at leaſt many of them, may be alſo provided for without *Innovations* in the Courſe of Nature. It is true,

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this amounts to a prodigious Scheme; but when we conſider, what a Maſs of *Wonders* the Univerſe is in other Regards; and what a Being God is, *incomprehenſibly* great and perfect, we cannot deny ſuch an *Adjuſtment* of Things to be within his Power. And in *Fact* particular Men are very commonly (at leaſt in ſome Meaſure) rewarded or puniſhed by the *general* Laws and Methods of Nature. The *natural* (tho' not conſtant) Conſequences of Virtue are Peace, Health, and Felicity; of Vice, Loſs of Philoſophical Pleaſures, a diſeaſed Body, Debts and Difficulties. P. 104.

3. It is not *impoſſible*, that Men, whoſe Natures and Actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the World in ſuch *Times*, *Places*, and other *Circumſtances*, as that their Acts and Behaviour may not only co-incide with the *general* Plan of Things, but alſo anſwer many *private* Caſes too. And if ſo, it will follow, that a *particular Providence* may be compatible with the natural Freedom of Men's Actions. Such a Suppoſition is certainly not beyond the Power of an *almighty*, *perfect* Being: It is moreover worthy of him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon thoſe Words and take their Import, muſt believe. The Antients had perhaps ſome ſuch Thoughts as theſe; for they were P. 105.

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generally *Fataliſts*, and yet do not ſeem to have thought, that they were *not Maſters* of their own Actions.

4. It is not *impoſſible* (for that is *all* that is here contended for) that many Things ſuitable to ſeveral Caſes, may be brought to paſs by Means of *ſecret*, and ſometimes *ſudden Influences* on
P. 106. our Minds, or the Minds of other Men, whoſe Acts may affect us. As, if the Caſe ſhould require, that *N* ſhould be deliver'd from ſome threatning *Ruin*, or *Misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he ſhould go ſuch a Way, at ſuch a Time, as he intended: Upon this Occaſion ſome *new* Reaſons may be preſented to his Mind, why he ſhould not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that Road*; or he may forget to go. After the ſame Manner, not only Deliverances from Dangers and Troubles, but Advantages and Succeſſes may be conferr'd. On the other Side, Men may, by way of Puniſhment for Crimes committed, incurr Miſchiefs and Calamities. I ſay, theſe Things and ſuch like *may be*: And perhaps there are but few of them who have made Obſervations on themſelves and their Affairs, but muſt, when they reflect on Life paſt, and the various Adventures and Events in it, find Inſtances, in which their uſual Judgment and Senſe of Things cannot but ſeem

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to themſelves to have been *over-ruled* they knew not *by what*, nor *how*, nor *why*; and that theſe Actions have had Conſequences very *remarkable* in their Hiſtory. Not to add, that the World has generally acknowledg'd, and therefore ſeems to have *experienced* ſome Aſſiſtance and Directions given to good Men by the Deity; that Men have been many Times infatuated, and loſt to themſelves, *&c.* If any one ſhould object, that if Men are thus over-ruled in their Actings, then they are deprived of their *Liberty*, &c. The Anſwer is, that tho' Man is a free Agent, he may not be free as to *every Thing*; his Freedom may be reſtrain'd, and he only accountable for thoſe Acts, in Reſpect of which he is free. *P.* 107.

5. There *poſſibly* may be, and moſt probably are Beings *inviſible*, and *ſuperior* in Nature to us, who may by *other* Means be in many Reſpects *Miniſters* of God's Providence, and Authors under him of many Events to particular Men, without *altering* the Laws of Nature. We have the greateſt Reaſon to think, that ſuch imperfect Beings, as we are, are far below the *Top* of the Scale. Nay, there may be many *Orders* of *ſuperior* Beings, riſing in Dignity of Nature, and Amplitude of Power, one above another. And as Men may be ſo placed as to become, even by the free Exer- *P.* 108. *P.* 109.

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ciſe of their own Powers, *Inſtruments* of God's particular Providence to other Men; ſo we may well ſuppoſe, that theſe *higher* Beings may be ſo diſtributed through the Univerſe, and ſubject to ſuch an Œconomy (tho' we pretend not to tell what it is) as may render them *alſo* Inſtruments of the ſame Providence; and that they may, in Proportion to their greater Abilities, be capable, *conſiſtently with the Laws of Nature*, ſome Way or other, tho' not in our Way, of influencing human Affairs in proper Places.

Laſtly, It is not pretended that Things muſt be juſt in this Manner; there muſt be *other Ways* above our Underſtanding, by which ſuch a Being as God is, may take Care of *private Caſes*, without interrupting the Order of the Univerſe. Only let this be added in general, that God cannot put Things ſo far out of his own Power, as that he ſhould not *for ever govern* Tranſactions and Events in his own World; nor can *perfect* Knowledge
P. 110. and Power ever want *proper* Means to atchieve what is fit to be done. So that, though what has been advanc'd ſhould ſtand for nothing, there *may* be a *particular Providence* notwithſtanding the forementioned Difficulty. And then, if there *may be* one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one: Becauſe in the

the Deſcription of Providence, nothing is ſuppoſed with reſpect to *particular Caſes*, but that they ſhould be provided for in ſuch a Manner as will at laſt beſt *agree with Reaſon*; which therefore may be moſt certainly depended upon from a *perfect* Being. It is therefore as certain, that there is a *particular Providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect Reaſon*. For if Men are treated according to Reaſon, they muſt be treated according to what they are; the virtuous, the juſt, the compaſſionate, *&c. as ſuch*; and the vicious, unjuſt, cruel, *&c.* according to *what they are*. And their ſeveral Caſes muſt be taken and conſider'd *as they are*; which cannot be done without *ſuch* a Providence.

If it be *objected*, that Things do not ſeem to be dealt with according to Reaſon; virtuous and good Men very often labouring under Adverſity, Pains, Perſecutions, whilſt vicious, wicked, cruel Men prevail and flouriſh: In *anſwer* to this Charge ſeveral Things may be ſaid. Let it here ſuffice to obſerve, that if what is objected be in many Inſtances true, this only infers the *Neceſſity* of a future State. And perhaps it is in Order to convince us of the Certainty of a future State, that Inſtances of that kind have been ſo *numerous*. *P.* 114.

XIX. *If we would behave our ſelves as being what we cannot but be ſenſible we are, towards* GOD, *as being what he is according to the foregoing Propoſitions, we muſt obſerve theſe following and the like Particulars.*

1. *We muſt not pretend to repreſent him by any Picture or Image whatſoever.* Becauſe this is flatly to deny his Incorporeity, incomprehenſible Nature, *&c.*

P. 115. 2. *We ought to be ſo far from doing this, that our Thoughts and Words of him ought to be in the moſt* reverent *Terms, and moſt proper Manner we are are able*; keeping withal this general Concluſion, that, tho' we do the beſt we can, he is ſtill ſomething *above all our Conceptions*; and deſiring that our faint Expreſſions may be taken as aiming at a *higher* and more *proportionable* Meaning. To do otherwiſe implies not only, that his Mode of Exiſtence and eſſential Attributes are comprehenſible by us, but alſo (which is more) that our Words and Phraſes, taken from among our ſelves, and the Objects of our Faculties, are adequate Expreſſions of them, *contrary to Truth.*

P. 116. For Inſtance, as God is a pure, uncompounded Being, his Attributes of *Mercy, Juſtice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them, becauſe in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly

be called together *divine Reaſon*; which, as it exerts it's ſelf upon this or that Occaſion is by us *variouſly* denominated. When we ſpeak of the *Knowledge* of God, we muſt not mean, that he knows Things *in the Way that we do*; but rather intend, in general, that there is nothing of which he is, or can be *ignorant*. When *Glory*, *Honour*, *Praiſe* are given to God; or he is ſaid to do any Thing for his own *Glory*, or we to propoſe the *Glory* of his Name in what we do; thoſe Words ſhould not be taken for *that Kind* of Glory and Applauſe, which is ſo induſtriouſly ſought, and capriciouſly diſtributed among us Mortals. To handle this a little more *largely*. Among us ſome are celebrated for ſmall Matters, either through the Ignorance of the Multitude, the Partiality of a Faction, the Advantage of great Friendſhips, the uſual Deference paid to Men in eminent Stations, or mere good Luck: And others for atchieving *ſuch Things*, as, if they were duly weighed and People were not impoſed upon by *falſe Notions*, would appear rather to be a Diſgrace to *Savages*, than any Recommendation of rational and *civiliz'd* Natures. Strength, and Courage, and Beauty, and Parts, and Birth, are followed with *Encomiums* and Honours, which, tho' they may be the Felicities and *Privileges* *P.* 117.

of the Poſſeſſors, cannot be their *Merit*, whilſt real Virtue and Induſtry (which give the *trueſt Title* to Praiſe) lie diſregarded. Thirſt after Glory, when that is deſired merely for it's own ſake, is founded in *Ambition* and *Vanity*; the Thing it's ſelf is but a *Dream*, and Imagination. Men pleaſe themſelves with Notions of *Immortality*, and fancy a Perpetuity of Fame ſecured to themſelves, by Books and Teſtimonies of Hiſtorians. But alas! it is a ſtupid Deluſion, when they imagine themſelves *preſent*, and *enjoying* that Fame at the reading of their Story after their Death. And beſide, *in Reality* the Man is not known ever the more to Poſterity, becauſe his Name is tranſmitted to them. When it is ſaid, *Julius Cæſar* beat *Pompey*, &c. it is the ſame Thing, as to ſay, the Conqueror of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæſar*. The Amount then is only this; that the Conqueror of *Pompey* conquer'd
P. 118. *Pompey*; or ſome Body conquer'd *Pompey*; or rather, ſince *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæſar*, *ſome Body* conquer'd *ſome Body*. Such a poor Buſineſs is this boaſted Immortality! There are, I think, two Conſiderations, which may juſtify a Deſire of *ſome* Glory or Honour, and ſcarce more. When Men have performed any *virtuous* Actions, it is a *reaſonable Pleaſure* to have the Teſtimony of the

the World added to that of their own Conſciences, that they have done well: And more than that, if the *Reputation* acquir'd by any Qualification or Action, may procure a Man any *real* Comfort or Advantage (if it be only Protection from the Inſolencies and Injuſtice of Mankind, or if it enables him to do by his Authority more good to others,) to have this Privilege muſt be a great Satisfaction, and what a *wiſe* and *good* Man may be allowed, as he has Opportunity, to propoſe to himſelf. But then he propoſes it no farther than it may be *uſeful*; and it can be no farther uſeful than he *wants* it. So that upon the whole, *Glory*, *Praiſe*, and the like, are either mere *Vanity*, or only valuable in Proportion to our *Defects* and *Wants*. In Concluſion therefore, tho' Men have been accuſtomed to ſpeak of the *Deity* in Terms taken from earthly *Princes*; and tho' conſidering what Defects there are in our Ways of thinking and ſpeaking, we cannot well part with them all: Yet we muſt remember to *exalt* the Senſe of them, or annex ſome *mental* Qualification to the Uſe of them. As, if God be ſaid to do Things for his own Glory, the Meaning in the Author's Opinion muſt be, that the tranſcendent Excellence of his Nature may be collected from the Form of the World, and

P. 119.

Adminiſtration of Things in it; where there occur ſuch *Marks* of inexpreſſible Wiſdom and Power, that he needed not to have given us *greater*, had he only intended his own *Glory*, or ſomething to this Purpoſe. Or if the Glory of what *we* do, be aſcribed to *him*; by this muſt be ſignify'd, that no Glory is due to us, who have no Powers, but what originally depend upon him; and that we deſire therefore to acknowledge him to be the true Author of all that which is *laudable* in us.

P. 120. Many more Reflections might be made upon *Epithets* and *Ways of ſpeaking*, introduced by Cuſtom, from rude Antiquity, or by Neceſſity, following from the Narrowneſs either of Men's Minds, or their Language *. It is plain, that *Love*, *Anger*, *Hands*, *Eyes*, &c. when aſcribed to God, cannot import ſuch

* *To ſpeak altogether properly of God, is not in our Power; becauſe, as was before obſerved, his Manner of Exiſtence and eſſential Attributes are not comprehenſible by us. We muſt therefore ſpeak of him as well as our finite Capacities will permit, and after the Manner of Men; or after ſuch a Manner as will be ſuitable to the Underſtanding and Capacities of the Generality of Mankind. This Manner of ſpeaking therefore of God, is not only not well to be parted with, but rather neceſſary to be us'd; only Care ſhould be taken, that it be not miſunderſtood, ſo as to give Men wrong Notions of him.*

bodily

bodily Parts or Paſſions as are found in us.

3. *We ſhall find our ſelves bound to worſhip him, in the beſt Manner we can.* For by worſhipping him is here meant nothing but owning him to be *what he is*, and our ſelves to be *what we are*, by ſome more *ſolemn* and proper Act; that is, by addreſſing our ſelves *as his Dependents* to him *as the ſupreme Cauſe*, and *Governour of the World*, with Acknowledgments of what we enjoy, Petitions for what we really want, or he knows to be convenient for us, and the like. As if we ſhould in ſome humble and compoſed Manner pray to that *Almighty Being, upon whom depends the Exiſtence of the World, and by whoſe Providence we have been preſerved to this Moment, and enjoyed many undeſerved Advantages; that he would graciouſly accept our grateful Senſe and Acknowledgments of all his Beneficence toward us. That he would deliver us from the evil Conſequences of all our Tranſgreſſions and Follies: That he would endue us* P. 121. *with ſuch Diſpoſitions and Powers, as may carry us innocently and ſafely through all future Trials, and may enable us upon all Occaſions to behave our ſelves conformably to the Laws of Reaſon, piouſly and wiſely. That he would ſuffer no Being to injure us, no Misfortune to befall us, nor us to hurt our ſelves by any Error or Miſ-con-*

duct of our own: That he would vouchſafe us clear and diſtinct Perceptions of Things; with ſo much Health and Proſperity, as may be good for us: That we may at leaſt paſs our Time in Peace, with Contentment and Tranquillity of Mind: And that having faithfully diſcharged our Duty to our Family and Friends, and endeavour'd to improve our ſelves in virtuous Habits and uſeful Knowledge, we may at laſt make a decent and happy Exit, and then find our ſelves in ſome better State. Not to do this, or ſomething like it, will certainly fall among thoſe criminal *Omiſſions* mention'd, Sect. I. Prop. V. For never to acknowledge the Enjoyments and Privileges we have received and hold of God, is in effect to *deny* that we receive them from him; not to apply to him for what we want, is to *deny* either our Wants, or his Power of helping us; and ſo on, all contrary to Truth.

It muſt be ever own'd, that no Worſhip can be proportionable to the divine Nature and Perfections, but yet that we are obliged to do what we can; therefore thoſe Words were added, *in the beſt Manner we can.* And it muſt be acknowledged farther, that thoſe Words do not oblige us to be *always* at our Devotions neither. For that is unſuitable to our Nature and Condition;

tion; and, if it could be done, would imply wrong Notions of God himſelf: Therefore that Limitation was inſerted, *by ſome ſolemn and proper Act.*

Tho' every Man knows beſt his own Opportunities and Circumſtance, and therefore may be moſt able to judge for himſelf, how he may *beſt* perform this Duty; yet in general it may be ſaid, that to the doing of it *ſolemnly*, and in the beſt Manner we can, theſe Things are required: An intent *Mind*, proper *Times* and *Places*, a proper *Form* of Words, and a proper *Poſture*. For if the *Mind* be abſent, it is not the *Man* that prays, it is only as it were the Noiſe of a Machine, which is put into Motion indeed, but without any Conſciouſneſs of it's own Act. Upon this Account it will be certain, that all Times and Places cannot be equally proper. Thoſe of *Retreat* and *Silence* ought to be ſought; and for this farther Reaſon, becauſe the farther we are removed from the Notice of others, the clearer we ſtand of all *Oſtentation*. As to a *Form* of Words, even that *Prayer* which is called *mental*, can ſcarce be made without Words, or ſomething equivalent. For *Words* ſeem to be as it were *Bodies* or *Vehicles* to the Senſe or Meaning, which is the *ſpiritual Part*, and which without the other can hardly be fix'd in the Mind.

p. 122.

p. 123.

Mind. And ſince to *think* over a Set of Words cannot be a more adequate Manner of addreſſing to God, than to *ſpeak* it over and think too: And moreover, ſince the very *Sound* of the Words affects us, and when the Form is ready prepared, and the being freed from the Labour of compoſing, doth really help *Attention*; ſince this is the Caſe, it muſt be better, when we have an Opportunity, to *pronounce* a Prayer, than only to *think* it over †. But then it ſhould be ſpoken no louder (when we pray privately) than juſt to make it audible to *our ſelves*. It is not upon God's Account that we ſpeak, ſince he would know even our Thoughts; but it is upon *our own* Account, and to make our *Adorations*, tho' imperfect at the beſt, as compleat as we are able (which by the Way is an Anſwer to them, who object againſt Prayer, the *Impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premiſed, and it being found that we muſt make Uſe of *Words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to uſe the *beſt* and *propereſt*

P. 124.

† *As to theſe Things, it is I think, proper to remind the Reader of what was ſaid above in general, that every Man knows beſt his own Opportunities and Circumſtances, and therefore may be moſt able to judge for himſelf.*

we

we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* Effuſions; and therefore there muſt be Forms *premeditated*; the *beſt* that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worſhip God to the beſt of our Capacity. As a Prayer ought to have all the Marks of Seriouſneſs and being in earneſt, it ought to be the *plaineſt*, and at the ſame Time is perhaps the *hardeſt* of all Compoſitions. It ought to take in a general View of what we have *enjoy'd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every Thing ought to be expreſs'd with *Method* *, in Phraſes that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with ſuch a *true* Eloquence, as engages all our Attention, and repreſents our *deepeſt* Senſe, without *Affectation* or *needleſs Repetitions*. The Author has therefore many Times wonder'd at thoſe Men, who diſpute againſt preconceived Forms of Prayer. They, who talk ſo much of the Spirit of Prayer, ſeem to know but little of it.

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* *What is here ſaid is rather applicable to* publick Prayer. *For as to our* private Prayer, *in reſpect of the Generality of Mankind, it is perhaps beſt they ſhould be taught, that it will altogether ſuffice, if they come to God, with honeſt and humble Minds, and with Reverence and Devotion offer up the Senſe of their Hearts to him, who, in order to know or to grant our Deſires, needs not the Eloquence nor the Language of his Creatures.*

As

As to the *Poſture*, that is beſt, which beſt *expreſſes* our Humility, Reverence, and Earneſtneſs, and affects us moſt.

There ought to be alſo a *Publick Worſhip* of the Deity. For beſides that Men may be conſider'd as Members of a *Society*; or the *Society* may be conſider'd as *one Body*, and *as ſuch*, are oblig'd to worſhip the Deity, and to offer one common Prayer; beſides the Need that thoſe, who know not of themſelves *how* to pray, or cannot read, have of ſome Time and Place *appointed*, where they may have ſuitable Prayers read to them, and be guided in their Devotions: Beſides theſe Things, I ſay, toward the keeping Mankind in Order, it is *neceſſary* there ſhould be ſome Religion profeſs'd, and even eſtabliſh'd; which cannot be, without ſome publick Worſhip. And were it not for that Senſe of Virtue, which is *principally* preſerv'd by national *Forms* and *Habits* of Religion, Men would ſoon loſe it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what elſe the worſt of Savages do.

P. 126. 4. And laſtly, *Rational Beings ſhould conſider in earneſt what a mighty Being he is, who by the Conſtitution of their Nature has laid them under an Obligation of being govern'd by their Reaſon, and whoſe Laws the Dictates of right Reaſon may be ſaid to be.* They ought to keep it well

impreſt upon their Minds, that he is the Being upon whom their *Exiſtence* depends: That it is he who ſuperintends and adminiſters the Affairs of the World by his *Providence*; that the Effects of his *Power* and *Influence* are viſible round about them, in all the *Phænomena* of Nature, not one of which could be without him; that they are always in his *Preſence*; that he is a Being of *perfect Reaſon*: That if it be *reaſonable* that the Tranſgreſſors of *Reaſon* ſhould be puniſh'd, they will moſt certainly *one Time or other*, be puniſh'd, *&c.* And then, if they do this, it is eaſy to ſee what Effect it muſt have upon all their *Thoughts, Words* † and *Actions.*

By what is ſaid here, no *Superſtition* is intended to be introduc'd: It is only the Practice of *Reaſon* and *Truth*, which is requir'd: And any thing that is *not inconſiſtent with them*, may be freely done, tho' under the Inſpection of our great Lawgiver himſelf.

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† *Particularly with Reſpect to cuſtomary Swearing; which beſide the ill Conſequences it has in making Oaths cheap, &c. is a great Inſtance of Diſregard and Irreverence. For they who uſe themſelves to it, do, at leaſt, make the venerable Name of God to ſerve for an* expletive *only; and commonly to rude, paſſionate, or debauched Diſcourſe.* Notes, p. 126.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Truths reſpecting Mankind *in general, antecedent to all human Laws.*

P. 127. I. *EVery Man hath in himſelf a Principle of Individuation, which diſtinguiſhes and ſeparates him from all other Men, in ſuch a Manner as may render him and them capable of diſtinct Properties in Things:* That is, *B* and *C* are ſo diſtinguiſh'd, that if there be any Thing which *B* can call his, it will be for that Reaſon not *C*'s; and what is *C*'s, will for that Reaſon not be *B*'s.

II. *There are ſome Things, to which (at leaſt before the Caſe is alter'd by voluntary Subjection, or the like) every individual Man has, or may have, ſuch a natural and immediate Relation, that he only of all Mankind can call them his.* Such are his *Life*, *Limbs*, *Labour*, the *Effect* or *Produce* of his *Labour*; and laſtly, ſuch
P. 128. Things as a Man may truly call *his* in ſome

ſome ſuch Senſe, or upon ſome ſuch Account, as *no other* can.

III. *Whatever is inconſiſtent with the general Peace and Welfare (or Good) of Mankind, is inconſiſtent with the Laws of human Nature, wrong, intolerable.* Thoſe Maxims or Principles, which promote the general *Tranquillity* and *Well-being* of Mankind; if thoſe Words expreſs the *Happineſs* of Mankind, muſt be the *true* Laws of Humanity; and all ſuch Practices as interfere with the one, muſt alſo interfere with the other. Becauſe *Happineſs* is the End of Society and Laws; which is true, when applied not only to a *particular* Society, but the *univerſal* Society of Mankind. It is contradictory to ſay, that any thing can be a *general* Law of *human* Nature, which tends only to favour the Pleaſures of *ſome Particulars*, to the Prejudice of the reſt. And the *Tranſgreſſion* of theſe Laws is *wrong*, and *morally Evil*; becauſe the general Welfare of a *rational Nature*, and the Laws which advance it, muſt be founded on *Reaſon*, nor can be oppos'd by any Thing, but what is oppoſite to *Reaſon*, and conſequently to *Truth*. P. 129.

IV. *Whatever is either reaſonable or unreaſonable in* B *with reſpect to* C, *would be*

be juſt the ſame in C *with reſpect to* B, *if the Caſe was inverted* *. Hence it follows, that a good Way to know what is right or wrong, in relation to *other Men*, is to conſider what we ſhould take Things to be were *we* in their Circumſtances.

V. *In a State of Nature Men are equal in Reſpect of Dominion.* The Caſe of *Parents* and their *Children* is here for
P. 130. the preſent excepted; and thoſe only are conſider'd between whom there is no Family-relation, or all Family-relation vaniſhed. In a State, where no *Laws* of Society made any Diſtinction, *Men* can only be conſider'd *as Men*, and as ſuch *B* is the ſame to *C*, that *C* is to *B*. And therefore *B* has no more Dominion over *C*, than *C* has over *B*; that is, they are in this Regard *equals*.

VI. *No Man can have a Right to begin to interrupt the Happineſs of another:*
P. 131. (That is, to invade the Rights of another who has given him no Cauſe ſo to do.) For this ſuppoſes a Dominion over him, and is manifeſtly *unreaſonable*.

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* *This is the Reaſon of that golden Rule, to do to others, as we would be done by.*

VII. *Yet*

VII. *Yet every Man has a Right to defend himſelf and his againſt Violence, to recover what is taken by Force from him, and even to make Repriſals, by all the Means that Truth and Prudence permit.* For if a Man has no Right to defend himſelf and what is his, he can have no Right to *any Thing*; ſince that cannot be his Right, which he may not *maintain* to be his Right. And ſince every Man is oblig'd to conſult his own Happineſs, he not only *may*, but even *ought* to defend it in ſuch a Manner, as does not interfere with *Truth*, or his own Deſign of being happy. He ought indeed not to act *raſhly*, or do *more* than the End propos'd requires. P. 132. P. 133.

By the ſame Means that a Man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any Kind of Violence taken from him. For the *Right* of it ſtill continues to be his, and he may uſe it as *his* accordingly.

A Man muſt alſo have a *Right* to the *Value* of what is forceably taken away from him. For the Thing is to him what it is *in Value* to him: And the Right he has in it, may be conſider'd as a Right to a Thing of *ſuch a Value*.

P. 134. VIII. *The first Possession of a Thing gives the Possessor a greater Right to it, than any other Man has, till he and all that claim under him are extinct.* For, till then, no other Man can be the *first Possessor* again, which is more than *nothing*; since he comes into it by God's Providence, P. 135. and as it were *Donation*; and no Man can expel another out of his Possession, without beginning to interrupt his Happiness, contrary to Prop. VI. Note, the *Successors* of an Invader, got into Possession wrongfully, may acquire a Right *in Time*, by the Failure of such as might claim under him who had Right. For he, who happens to be in Possession, when all these are extinct, is in the Place of a *prime Occupant*.

IX. *A Title to many Things may be transferr'd by Compact or Donation.* This depends upon every one's Right of disposing what *is his own*, as he thinks best; which is but using it *as his own*.

P. 136. X. *There is then such a Thing as Property, founded in Nature and Truth*, by Prop. II, VIII, IX.

XI. *Those Things which only one Man can truly and properly call his, must remain his till he agrees to part with them (if they*

they are ſuch as he may part with) by Compact or Donation; or till they fail, or Death extinguiſhes him and his Title together, and he delivers the Lamp to his next Man. For,

XII. *To have the Property of any Thing, and to have the ſole Right of uſing and diſpoſing of it, are the ſame Thing.*

XIII. *He who uſes or diſpoſes of any Thing, does by that declare it to be his.* P. 137.

XIV. *To uſurp or invade the Property of another Man is Injuſtice. The contrary, to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is Juſtice.*

XV. *All Injuſtice is wrong and evil*; as being plainly contrary to *Truth* and *Reaſon*. The very *attempting* any Inſtance of Injuſtice, or *aſſiſting* others in ſuch an Attempt, and even the *Deſire* of obtaining any Thing unjuſtly, muſt be by the Terms *wrong* and *evil*: It being to deſire, attempt, or aſſiſt in doing that which is *evil*. P. 138.

Let it be here obſerv'd concerning *Covetouſneſs*, that there ſeem to be three Sorts of it. One is a Deſire of getting from others, tho' *unjuſtly*: This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immenſe, *unreaſonable*, and inſatiable Deſire of

heaping up all one can by juſt Methods: This alſo intrenches upon Truth. But to *covet* to obtain what is another Man's by *juſt Means*, and with his Conſent, when it may contribute to the Happineſs of our ſelves, or Families, and perhaps of the other Perſon too, has nothing ſurely blameable in it [unleſs the Word *covet* may ſeem to expreſs a greater Eagerneſs of Deſire, than is fit to be plac'd on any thing here.]

P. 139. XVI. *When a Man cares not what Sufferings he cauſes to others, and eſpecially if he delights in other Mens Sufferings, this is Cruelty. And not to be affected with the Sufferings of other People, tho' they proceed not from us, but from others, or from Cauſes in which we are not concern'd, is Unmercifulneſs. Mercy and Humanity are the Reverſe of theſe.*

XVII. *He, who religiouſly regards Truth and Nature, will not only not be unjuſt, but (more) not unmerciful, and much leſs cruel.* There is ſomething in *human* Nature reſulting from our very Make and
P. 140. Conſtitution, which diſpoſes us to *Compaſſion.* It is therefore according to *Nature* to be affected with the Sufferings of other People; and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural.* Such alſo are the *Circumſtances* of Mankind, that it is for

the common Good and Welfare of the *Majority at leaſt* of Mankind, that they ſhould *compaſſionate* and *help* each other. To do the contrary muſt therefore be contrary to Nature, and *wrong*, by Prop. III. And every one certainly would think it reaſonable to receive Compaſſion and Help in Diſtreſs in *his own Caſe*, and it muſt be equally reaſonable for him to compaſſionate and help others in *theirs*, Prop. IV.

If Unmercifulneſs, as before defin'd, be wrong, no Time need be ſpent in proving that *Cruelty* is ſo.

XVIII. *The Practice of Juſtice and Mercy is juſt as Right, as Injuſtice, Unmercifulneſs and Cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the Nature of Contraries. P. 141.

XIX. *From the foregoing Propoſitions may be deduc'd the Heinouſneſs of all ſuch Crimes as Murder, or even the hurting the Perſon of another any how, when our own neceſſary Defence does not require it,* (it being not poſſible, that any Thing ſhould be more *his*, than *his own* Perſon, Life and Limbs;) *robbing, ſtealing, cheating, betraying; Defamation, Detraction; defiling the Bed of another Man,* &c. *with all the Approaches and Tendencies towards them.* For theſe are not only compriz'd within the Definition of Injuſtice; but

commonly, and ſome of them always, come within the Deſcription of *Cruelty* too.

P. 142. Particularly in the Caſe *of Adultery*; the Adulterer denies the *Property* a Huſband has in his Wife by Compact, the moſt expreſs and ſacred that can poſſibly be made; he does that which tends to ſubvert the Peace of Families, confounds Relation, and is altogether inconſiſtent with the *Order* and *Tranquillity* of the World, and therefore with the Laws of human Nature: He does what no Man in his Wits could think *reaſonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the Perſon wrong'd. Briefly, he impudently treats a Woman *as his own Woman* (or Wife) who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *Juſtice*, *Truth* and *Fact*. Nor is this Injuſtice only, but Injuſtice heighten'd with ſeveral Aggravations. Nor may
P. 143. this Crime be excus'd from it's Secrecy. For the Injuſtice of the Fact *is the ſame in it's ſelf*, whether known or not. And ſince no *Retreat* can be impervious to his Eye (who is the Author of Nature) no doubt there is to every wrong and *vicious* Act, a ſuitable Degree of Unhappineſs and *Puniſhment* annex'd, which the Criminal will be ſure to meet with *ſome Time or other*.

It will be eaſily perceiv'd that all thoſe Things which have any *Tendency* towards

towards any of thoſe Crimes aforementioned, or *Affinity* with them, or any Way *countenance* them, muſt be in their Degree criminal. Hence *Envy*, *Malice*, *Calumny* and *Detraction*, *many Freedoms* and reputed Civilities of barbarian Extract, and eſpecially Gallantries, ſowing the Seeds of Diſcords and Quarrels by *Stories* or *Inſinuations*, and even *intermeddling* in other People's Affairs, are all criminal. How guilty then muſt they be, who are deſignedly the *Promoters* or *Inſtruments* of Injuſtice and Wickedneſs, ſuch as mercenary Swearers and falſe Witneſſes, Traders in Scandal, Solicitors in Vice, they who intend by their *Converſation* to relax Men's Principles too much, and (as it ſeems) prepare them for Knavery, Lewdneſs, or any flagitious Enterprize? P. 144.

There are other Crimes, ſuch as *Infidelity* to Friends, or them who intruſt us with any Thing; *Ingratitude*, all kinds of wilful Perjury, and the like; which might have been mention'd in the Propoſition, being great Inſtances of Injuſtice: But becauſe they are *viſibly* ſuch, they are compriz'd in the *&c.* there.

SECT. VII.

Truths reſpecting particular Societies *of Men, or* Governments.

P. 145. I. MAN *is a ſocial Creature; that is, a ſingle Man or Family, cannot ſubſiſt, or not well, alone out of Society.* The Condition and Circumſtances of human Nature ſhew this; and Society is P. 147. what Men generally *deſire.* And tho' *much* Company may be attended with much Vanity, and occaſion many Evils, yet abſolute and perpetual *Solitude* has ſomething in it very irkſome and hideous. Thus the ſocial Life is *natural* to Man.

II. *The End of Society is the common Welfare and Good of the People aſſociated.* For becauſe Men cannot ſubſiſt *well*, or not *ſo well*, ſeparately, therefore they unite into greater Bodies.

III. *A*

III. *A Society into which Men enter for this End, ſuppoſes ſome Rules or Laws, according to which they agree all to be govern'd, with a Power of altering or adding to them as Occaſion ſhall require.* For a Number of Men met together without any *Rules*, can be nothing but an *irregular* Multitude, where *Confuſion* and *Unhappineſs* muſt prevail. And as the pub- *P.* 148.
lick Good is to be conſider'd at *one* Time as much as at *another*, the Power of making *new* Laws, and of *altering* or *repealing old* ones, muſt always ſubſiſt.

IV. *Theſe Laws and Determinations muſt be ſuch, as are not inconſiſtent with natural Juſtice.* For to eſtabliſh *Injuſtice*, is to oppoſe the Laws of our Creator, and the general Good and Happineſs *P.* 149.
of Men.

V. *A Society limited by Laws, ſuppoſes Magiſtrates, and a Subordination of Powers; that is, it ſuppoſes a Government of ſome Form or other.* Conſidering the Nature and Cir- *P.* 150.
cumſtances of Men, an *Army* may be as well ſuppoſed to be well diſciplin'd, well provided, and well conducted, without either *General* or *Officers*, as a Society without *Governors*, or their *ſubordinate* Magiſtrates, or (which is the ſame) without

out *ſome Form* of Government, to anſwer the End of it's being.

VI. *A Man may part with ſome of his natural Rights, and put himſelf under the Government of Laws and Magiſtrates, in Order to gain the Protection of them, and the Privileges of a regular Society.* Becauſe by this he doth but exchange one Thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much.

If it be ask'd, *what* natural Rights a Man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them, the *general* Anſwer may be this. Some Things are *eſſential* to our being, and ſome *it is not in our Power* to part with. As to the *reſt*, he may depart from them ſo far as it is conſiſtent with the *End* for which he does this; not farther, becauſe beyond that lies a Contradiction.

P. 151. VII. *Men may become Members of a Society by giving their Conſent, either explicitely, or implicitely.* That a Man may ſubject himſelf to Laws, we have ſeen. If he does this, he muſt do it either in *his own Perſon*, or he muſt do it by ſome *Proxy*; or his Conſent muſt be *collected* only from the Conformity of his Carriage, his adhering to the Society, accepting the Benefits of it's Conſtitution,

tion, and acquieſcing in the eſtabliſh'd Methods, and what is done by Virtue of them. By the *two firſt* Ways he declares himſelf *explicitely* and *directly*; by the laſt his Conſent is given indeed *implicitely*, and leſs directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a Party.

VIII. *When a Man is become a Member of a Society, if he would behave himſelf according to Truth, he ought to behave himſelf according to his Subordination or Place in the Community, and to obſerve the Laws of it.* P. 152.

IX. *In reſpect of thoſe Things, which the Laws of the Place take no Cognizance of, or if they do, when the Benefit of them cannot be had* (as it may ſometimes happen) *he who is a Member of the Society in other Reſpects, retains his natural Liberty, and muſt endeavour to act according to Truth, and his beſt Prudence.* For in the *former* Caſe there is nothing to limit him, by the Suppoſition, but Truth and Nature. And in the *other* it is the ſame, as if it were nothing; ſince in *Effect* there is no Law, where no *Effect* or Benefit from it is to be had: As for Example, if a Man ſhould be attack'd by Thieves or Murderers, and has no *Opportunity* or *Power* to call the proper Magiſtrate to his Aſſiſtance. There is

is a *third* Caſe; and that is, when Laws are plainly contrary to *Truth* and *natural Juſtice*. In this Caſe *both* cannot oblige, and it is eaſy to diſcern *which* ought to give way.

P. 153.

X. *Kingdoms and Commonwealths may defend themſelves againſt other Nations*, or, *War may lawfully be wag'd in Defence and for the Security of a Society, it's Members and Territories, or for Reparation of Injuries.* For if *one* Man may in a State of Nature have a Right to defend himſelf (ſee Sect. VI. Prop. VII.) *two* may, or *three*, and ſo on. And if this may be done by Men in a State of Nature, it may be done by them, when confederated among themſelves: Becauſe with Reſpect to other Nations, they are ſtill in *that State*, ſo far as they have not limited themſelves by *Leagues* and *Alliances*. And perhaps by this Rule, regard being had to what has been deliver'd in Sect. VI. the *Juſtice* of foreign Wars may be not untruly eſtimated.

Mutual Defence is one of the great Ends of Society, if not the greateſt, and in a particular and eminent Manner involves in it Defence againſt *foreign Enemies*. And he, who ſignalizes himſelf in a proper Manner, when there is Occaſion for his Service, merits the grateful Acknowledgments and Celebrations

tions of his Countrymen. But as to thoſe *Wars* which are undertaken by Men out of Ambition, theſe are founded upon falſe Notions of Glory, and *condemn'd* by all true Philoſophy and Religion.

SECT. VIII.

Truths concerning Families *and* Relations.

THIS Section begins, as Relation it's ſelf does, with *Marriage*.

I. *The End of Marriage is the Propagation of Mankind, and joint Happineſs of the Couple intermarrying; or the latter by it's ſelf.* As to the *latter*, no Body can be ſuppos'd to marry without a Preſumption of ſome *Degree* of Happineſs to accrue; and tho' the *Bridegroom* and *Bride* themſelves ſhould have not, yet Nature (or rather it's great Author) has a *farther Aim*, the Preſervation of the Kind. P. 155. P. 156.

II. *Marriages are made by ſome ſolemn Contract, Vow, or Oath, (and theſe perhaps attended with ſome Pledge or nuptial Rites) by which the Parties mutually engage*

P. 157. *gage to live together in Love, and to be faithful, aſſiſting, and the like, each to other, in all Circumſtances of Health and Fortune, till Death parts them.* There is no coming together after the Manner of *Man* and *Wife* upon any other Foot; that is, ſomething muſt paſs between them, that is *declarative* of their Intentions, *expreſſes* their Vows, and binds them each to the other.

III. *That intimate Union by which the married Couple become poſſeſs'd each of the other's Perſon, the Mixture of their Fortunes, and the joint Relation they have to their Children, all ſtrengthen the Bonds and Obligations of Matrimony.*

P. 158. IV. *Marrying, when there is little or no Proſpect of true Happineſs, and eſpecially if there are plain Preſages of Unhappineſs; after Marriage, Adultery; all Kinds of Infidelity; transferring that Affection, which even under the Decays of Nature ought to preſerve it's Vigour, and never to degenerate (at worſt) but into a Friendſhip of a ſuperior Kind, and the like, are all wrong.* The *firſt* of theſe is to act as if that was the *leaſt* and moſt trifling of all Tranſactions in Life, which is certainly one of the *greateſt* and moſt delicate. And a Miſbehaviour in any of the *other* Ways, being repugnant to *Truth*, is a

Sin againſt it, and the mighty Patron of it. And if ſuch ſacred Compacts as thoſe of Marriage are allow'd to be broken, there is an End of all Faith.

The *Man* and *Woman* being thus conſider'd among themſelves, it is now proper in the Order of Nature to conſider them as *Parents*. P. 159.

V. *Parents ought to educate their Children, take the beſt Care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to aſſiſt them.* Not to do this, is to tranſgreſs the *Law* eſtabliſh'd by Nature for the Preſervation of the Race, which, as Things are, could not without a parental Care and Affection be continued; a *Law*, which is in Force among all the other Tribes of *Animals*, ſo far as there is Occaſion for it: And not only ſo, but it is alſo a heinous Inſtance of *Cruelty*. And not only the *Care*, but the *early Care* of Parents is required, leſt Death ſhould prevent them. P. 160.

VI. *In Order to the Good of Children, their Education*, &c. *there muſt be ſome Authority over them lodg'd by Nature in the Parents.* The Nature of *Infancy*, *Childhood* and *Youth* ſhew this; and moreover, the *Fortunes* of Children, and their Manner of ſetting out in the World depending P. 161.

P. 162. pending (commonly) upon their Parents, they muſt upon this Account be their *Directors*, and *govern* their Affairs.

But *parental Authority* is a very different Thing from a *Dominion* over their Children. It only reſpects the *Good* of the Children, and reaches not beyond the Means, which the *Parents*, acting according to the beſt of their Skill, Abilities and Opportunities, find moſt conducive to *that End*. And therefore they, who found *Monarchy* in paternal Authority, gain little Advantage with Reſpect to *deſpotick* or *abſolute* Power. A Power to be exercis'd for the *Good* of Subjects (like that of *Parents* for the *Good* of their Children) can only be deriv'd from hence. Beſide, if a Parent hath Authority over his Children, it doth not follow, that the *eldeſt Son* ſhould have the ſame Authority, be it what it will, over his *Brothers* and *Siſters*: And much leſs that the *Heir* of the P. 163. *firſt Parent* ſhould in ſucceeding Generations have it over all the *Collaterals*. The very *Relation* between them ſoon vaniſhes, and comes at laſt in Effect to nothing, and this *Notion* with it.

VII. *As Parents are oblig'd to educate their Children*, &c. *ſo Children ought to conſider*

conſider Parents as the immediate Authors (Authors under the firſt and great Cauſe) of their being.

VIII. *A great Submiſſion, and many grateful Acknowledgments, much Reſpect and Piety are due from Children to their Parents.* For the Authority in Parents demands a proportionable Submiſſion on the other Side; ſince an Authority, to which no *Obedience* is due, is equal to *none*. And to diſobey or diſregard them, is to forget they have been the Inſtruments of our being, and what *Pains*, what *Trouble*, how many *Frights* and *Cares*, what *Charges*, and what *Self-denials* Parents undergo upon the Score of their Children.

God, as the firſt Cauſe of all Beings, is, in a large Senſe of the Word, the *Father* of us all, and if we behave our ſelves towards him as *being ſuch*, we cannot but *adore* him (according to Sect. V. Prop. IX.) Something *analogous*, tho' in a low Degree, to the Caſe between God and his Off-ſpring, there ſeems to be in the Caſe between *Parents* and their *Children*. If that requires *divine Worſhip*, this will demand a great *Reſpect* and Reverence. And a Child who doth not honour his *Parent*, is not likely to worſhip his *Creator*; that Pre- P. 164.

cept of *honouring Parents*, to be found in almoſt all Nations and Religions, ſeems to proceed from ſome ſuch Sentiment: For in Books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worſhipping the Deity*.

P. 165. IX. *That* στοργὴ *or Affection on both Sides, which naturally and regularly is in Parents towards their Children, and in Children towards their Parents, ought to be obſerv'd and follow'd, when there is no Reaſon to the contrary.* For this ought to be taken as a *Suggeſtion* of Nature, which ſhould always be regarded, when it is not ſuperſeded by ſomething *ſuperior*, that is, by *Reaſon*. And farther, as this natural Affection is deſign'd for a reaſonable End, not to act *according to* it, is not to act according to Reaſon.

X. *The ſame is true of that Affection, which other Relations naturally have, in*
P. 167. *ſome Proportion or other, each for other.* In general this may be taken as evident, that *next after* our Parents and our own Offſpring, Nature directs us to be helpful in the *firſt place* to Brothers and Siſters, and *then* to other Relations, according to their reſpective Diſtances in the Genealogy of the Family, *preferably* to all Foreigners. But many Circumſtances

ſtances and Incidents in Life may affect this *Obligation*, and alter the Degrees of it.

SECT. IX.

Truths belonging to a private Man, *and reſpecting (directly) only himſelf.*

I. HE *that well examines himſelf, will find not only that he is a rational Animal, but that he is conſcious of a Liberty to act or not to act; and therefore that he is ſuch a Being, whoſe Acts may be morally good or evil; that there are in him many Inclinations and Averſions, which prompt him to act this Way or that Way, that he has great Defects and Limitations in the Uſe of his rational Faculties and Powers of Action, upon many Occaſions; as alſo that his Paſſions are many times apt to take wrong Turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceſſive: In other Words, that he is in many Reſpects fallible and infirm. And laſtly, that he deſires to be happy; as every Thing muſt, that underſtands what is meant by it.*

P. 168.

P. 169.

II. *If then he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to* Truth *and* Fact*) he muſt do ſuch Things as theſe.*

1. *He muſt ſubject his ſenſual Inclinations, his bodily Paſſions, to Reaſon; and try every Thing by it.* For the great *Law* impos'd upon him is to be *govern'd* by
P. 170. *Reaſon*, (Sect. III. Prop. XI.) And he who purſues only ſenſual Objects, and leaves himſelf to the Impulſes of Appetite and Paſſion, metamorphoſes himſelf into a *Brute*; and when moreover he makes his rational Powers to *ſerve* the brutiſh Part, to aſſiſt and promote it, he heightens and increaſes the *Brutality*, and becomes a *Monſter*.
P. 171. His Duty then is to ſee that he complies with no *corporeal* Inclinations at the Expence of his *Reaſon*; but that all his *Paſſions* be directed towards ſuch *Objects*, and in ſuch *Meaſure*, *Time* and *Place* as that allows. Every Word and Action ſhould be conducted by *Reaſon*. This is the Foundation, and indeed the Sum of all Virtue *.

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* *This certainly excludes all that Talk, which familiarizes Vice, takes off thoſe Reſtraints which Men have from Nature or a modeſt Education, and is ſo utterly deſtructive of Virtue, that* Ariſtotle *baniſhes it out of the Commonwealth.* Notes, p. 171.

2. *He muſt take Care not to bring upon himſelf Want, Diſeaſes, Trouble; but on the contrary endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable Subſiſtence, as far as he can, without contradicting any Truth:* (That is, without doing any Thing he ought not to do.) This Limitation is neceſſary to be obſerv'd; but otherwiſe not to conſult one's own Safety, Support, and reaſonable Satisfaction, and eſpecially to take a Counter-courſe, and expoſe himſelf, is to forget the Condition and Circumſtances of his Nature. *Thoſe Evils* which it is not in a Man's Power to prevent, he muſt endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently:* And in Order to this, it is good to be prepar'd for all Attacks, eſpecially the *laſt, great* one. P. 172.

3. *He muſt conſider even bodily and ſenſual Affections, Paſſions, and Inclinations as Intimations, which,* many times, *he not only may, but ought to hearken to.* For what ſhould hinder, when there is no *Reaſon* againſt them, but that the *inferior Springs* ſhould retain their Nature, and act. And our Paſſions, when they obſerve their due *Subordination* to Reaſon, (when they proceed not from unjuſtifiable Cauſes, or terminate in wrong Objects, or are unſeaſonable and immoderate, *vid. p.* 172. *ſub fine)* are of admirable Uſe in Life, and tend *many Times* P. 173.

* P. 174. to noble Ends. But they are ſo very apt to grow upon us, and to become *exorbitant*, that Care muſt be taken that they be kept under the Command of P. 175. *Reaſon*. Yet the Gratification of our Appetites, when *Truth* and *Reaſon* allow, ſeems to be the *very Means*, by which the Author of Nature intended to *ſweeten* the Journey of Life: And a Man may upon the Road as well muffle himſelf up againſt Sunſhine and blue Sky, and expoſe himſelf bare to Rains, and Storms, and Cold, as debar himſelf of the *innocent Delights* of his Nature for affected Melancholy, Want and Pain. Yet,

4. *He* muſt *uſe what Means he can to cure his own Defects, or at leaſt to prevent the Effects of them; learn to deny Temptations, or keep them at a proper Diſtance; even mortify, where Mortification is neceſſary; and always carry about him the Senſe of his being but a Man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himſelf to the *Condition* of his *Nature*. And tho' the Advice here given, to *deny one's ſelf* or *Inclinations* in Things in themſelves *lawful* and not unreaſonable, may ſeem to infer a Contradiction to what has been juſt before ſaid; yet when we deny our Inclinations, in order to better our Natures, or prevent Crimes; tho' to follow thoſe Inclina-

tions might *otherwiſe* be right, in *theſe Circumſtances*, and under this View there ariſes a good Reaſon againſt it, and they accordingly muſt therefore give Way, which is all that is intended. The laſt Clauſe of the Propoſition will oblige Men not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modeſt, and humble, and rather diffident of themſelves: Not to cenſure the Failings of others too hardly, not to be over-ſevere in puniſhing or exacting Juſtice, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, manſuete, and ſo forth. P. 176.

5. *He ought to examine his own Actions and Conduct, and where he finds he has tranſgreſs'd, to repent.* That is, if the Tranſgreſſion be againſt his Neighbour, and the Nature of it admits, to make *Reparation*, or at leaſt as far as he can: In other Caſes, when that which is done cannot be *recall'd*, or *repair'd*, or terminates in *himſelf* only; to live however in a Senſe of his Fault, and to prove by ſuch Acts as are proper, that he deſires *Forgiveneſs*, and heartily wiſhes it undone; which is as it were an Eſſay towards the *undoing* of it, and all that now can be; and laſtly, to uſe all poſſible Care not to *relapſe*. All this is involv'd in the *Idea* of a Fault or Action that is wrong, as it preſents it's ſelf to a rational Mind.

6. *He muſt labour to improve his rational Faculties by ſuch Means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and conſiſtent with his*
P. 177. *Circumſtances.* No Man indeed is oblig'd beyond his Abilities and Opportunities, (by Sect. IV. Prop. II.) but every Man may, *in ſome Degree* or *other*, endeavour to cultivate his Nature, and poſſeſs himſelf of uſeful Truths. And not to do this, is to caſt off *Reaſon*, apoſtatize from Humanity, and recoil into the beſtial Life.

P. 178. 7. *He muſt attend to Inſtruction, and even aſk Advice, eſpecially in Matters of Conſequence.* Not to do this, is to *deny* that his Faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible, and perhaps that it is poſſible for another to *know* what he *does* not. It is not meant, that a Man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the Opinion of another, unleſs he has *in himſelf* a good Reaſon ſo to do, which many Times happens; but by the Aſſiſtance of another, and hearing what he has to ſay, to *find out* more certainly, on which Side *Reaſon*, *Truth* and *Happineſs* (which always keep cloſe together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a Man's *own Reaſon* at laſt, which governs.

P. 179. Laſtly, *He muſt labour to clear his Mind of thoſe Preoccupations and Incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder*

him from reaſoning freely, and judging impartially. For he who would uſe his rational Faculties, muſt in the firſt Place diſentangle them, and render them *fit* to be us'd: And he who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to uſe them; that is, he proclaims himſelf *irrational.*

The Sum of all is this: It is the Duty of every *Man*, to behave himſelf in all Reſpects, as far as he is able, according to Reaſon. And from hence it will follow farther, that

III. *Every Man is oblig'd to live virtuouſly and piouſly:* Becauſe to practice *Reaſon* and *Truth*, is to live after that Manner. That we are oblig'd to behave our ſelves *reverently* and *dutifully* towards that almighty Being, on whom we depend; and with *Juſtice*, and a tender Regard to the Properties of other Men, we have already ſeen. And as to thoſe Virtues, which reſpect a *Man's ſelf*, our Obligation alſo thereto will be as apparent, when we are told what is meant by ſome of the *principal* ones.

Prudence, the Queen of Virtues, is nothing but chuſing (after Things have been duly weigh'd) and uſing the moſt reaſonable Means to obtain ſome End, that

that is reaſonable. This is therefore *directly* the Exerciſe of Reaſon.

Temperance permits us all the reaſonable Uſe of Meat and Drink, and only confines us to ſuch *Kinds*, *Quantities* and *Seaſons*, as may beſt conſiſt with our Health, the Uſe of our Faculties, our Fortune, *&c.*

P. 180.

Chaſtity does not pretend to *extinguiſh* our tender Paſſions, but only bids us not indulge them againſt *Reaſon* and *Truth*, to divert our Inclinations by Buſineſs, or ſome honeſt Amuſement, till we can gratify them *lawfully*, *conveniently*, *regularly*; and even then to participate of the Myſteries of Love with *Modeſty*, as within a Veil or ſacred Incloſure, not with a canine Impudence.

Frugality indeed not only cuts off all *Profuſion* and *Extravagance*, but even deducts ſomething from that, which according to the preſent Appearance might be *afforded*; but it is, becauſe the Uncertainty of human Affairs makes it proper to do ſo. And it forbids no Inſtance of *Generoſity*, or even *Magnificence*, which is agreeable to the Man's Station and Circumſtances, or (which is tantamount) to the *Truth* of his Caſe.

P. 181.

Since then to live *virtuouſly* is to practiſe *Reaſon*, and act conformably to *Truth*, he who lives ſo muſt be *ultimately happy*, by Sect. II. Prop. XIV. And therefore

therefore not only the Commands of Reaſon, but even the Deſire of Happineſs will oblige a Man to live ſo. It may be collected even from *Experience*, that the *virtuous Life* compar'd with the *contrary*, if one looks no farther than the preſent State, is the *happier Life*. Who ſees not that the *vicious* Life is full of Dangers and Solicitudes, and uſually ends ill? Perhaps in Rottenneſs and Rags, or at leaſt in a peeviſh and deſpicable Diſcontent. However, *Virtue* will *P.* 182. make a Man happy *hereafter* in ſome other State, whatever his Lot may be *here:* For *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *muſt be*.

To ſay ſomewhat in the Cloſe of *Fortitude*. If it be taken for natural Courage, this is Conſtitution and the *Gift of God*, not any Virtue in us; to *uſe it rightly* is. But *Fortitude* conſider'd as a *P.* 183. *Virtue*, conſiſts in ſtanding and endeavouring to overcome Dangers and Oppoſitions, when they cannot be avoided without the Violation of *Reaſon* and *Truth*. If a Man can *prevent* or *eſcape* any Peril or Trouble, without Guilt, he ought to do it. But where that cannot be done, he muſt exert himſelf according to his *Abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the Succeſs to divine Providence. This is the true *Virtue* of *Fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly

and honeſtly to act as *Truth* [or our Duty] *requires.* It has for it's *Object* not only bold Undertakings, but in general all the *Evils of Life*, which a Man muſt labour by Prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done, to bear with Reſignation, Decency, and an humble Expectation of an Adjuſtment of all Events in a *future State:* The Belief of which is in the Sequel ſhewn to be no vain or groundleſs Conceit.

IV. *Every one finds in himſelf a Conſciouſneſs of his own Exiſtence and Acts,* (which is Life) *with a Power of apprehending, thinking, reaſoning, willing, beginning and ſtopping many Kinds and Degrees of Motion in his own Members,* &c.

P. 184. V. *That which in Man is the Subject or* Suppoſitum *of Self-conſciouſneſs, thinks and has the aforeſaid Faculties* (of the Soul) *muſt be ſomething different from his Body or Carcaſs.* He doth not find himſelf to think, ſee, hear, *&c. all over* in any Part of his Body; but the Seat of Cogitation and Reflexion he finds in his Head. It is plainly ſomething which reſides *there*, that by the Mediation of the Nerves governs the Body, ſees
P. 185. through the Eyes, *&c.* Again, as a Man peruſes and *conſiders* his own *Body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be ſomething

ſomething different from the *Conſiderer?* And it is plain there are two *different* *Intereſts* in Men, thoſe of Paſſion and Reaſon: Which being many Times directly *oppoſite*, muſt belong to *different Subjects*. And as we perceive *ſomething within us*, which is (or ſhould be) the Governour of the Body, it muſt upon this Account be concluded to be *different* from it. P. 186.

VI. *The Soul cannot be mere Matter.* For if it is, then either *all Matter* muſt think, or the Difference muſt ariſe from the different *Modification*, *Magnitude*, *Figure*, or *Motion* of ſome Parcels of Matter in Reſpect of others, or a Faculty of thinking muſt be *ſuperadded* to ſome Syſtems of it, which is not ſuperadded to others.

1. That Poſition, which makes *all Matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the Apprehenſions and Knowledge we have of the Nature of it; nor can it be true, unleſs our Senſes and Faculties be contriv'd only to *deceive* us.

2. The Faculties of thinking, *&c.* cannot ariſe from the *Size*, *Figure*, *Texture*, or *Motion* of it: Becauſe Bodies by the Alteration of theſe only become greater or leſs, round or ſquare, or the like; all which *Ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no* P. 187.

Relation

Relation between them. These Modifications and Affections of Matter are ſo far from being *Principles* or *Cauſes* of thinking and acting, that they are themſelves but *Effects*, proceeding from the Action of ſome other Matter or Thing upon it, and are Proofs of it's Paſſivity, Deadneſs, and utter Incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to Senſe. Beſides, ſince Magnitude, Figure, Motion, are but *Accidents* of Matter, not *Matter*, and only the *Subſtance* is truly Matter; and ſince the *Subſtance* of any one Part of Matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* Matter can be by Nature cogitative, *all* muſt be ſo. But this we have ſeen cannot be.

P. 189.

3. So then in Concluſion, if there is any ſuch Thing as *Matter that thinks*, &c. a *Faculty of thinking* muſt be *ſuperadded* to certain Parts or Parcels of it, which by the way, muſt infer the Exiſtence of ſome Being able to confer this Faculty. But the Truth is, Matter ſeems not to be capable of ſuch Improvement, of being made to think. For ſince it is not of the *Eſſence* of Matter, it cannot be *made to be ſo* without making Matter *another Kind* of Subſtance from what it is. It were to change Death into Life, Incapacity of thinking into Cogitativity, Neceſſity into Liberty. And to ſay,

P. 191.

that

that God may *ſuperadd* a Faculty of thinking, moving it's ſelf, *&c.* to Matter, if by this be meant that he may make Matter to be the *Suppoſitum* of theſe Faculties (that Subſtance in which they inhere) is the ſame in Effect as to ſay, that God may ſuperadd a Faculty of *thinking* to *Incogitavity*, of acting *freely* to *Neceſſity*, and ſo on. What Senſe is there in this? And yet ſo it muſt be, while Matter continues to be Matter.

It is plain enough, that the *Mind*, tho' it acts under great Limitations, doth however in many Inſtances *govern* the Body arbitrarily: And it is monſtrous to ſuppoſe this Governour to be be nothing but ſome fit *Diſpoſition* or *Accident* (ſuperadded) of the Matter which is governed. A *Ship*, it is true, would not be fit for *Navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper Manner: But then, when it has it's proper Form, and is become a *Syſtem* of Materials fitly diſpos'd, it is not this *Diſpoſition* that governs it. It is the *Man*, that other Subſtance, who ſits at the Helm, and they who manage the Sail and Tackle that do this. So *our Veſſels*, without a proper Organization of Parts, would not be capable of being acted as they are; but ſtill it is not the Shape, or Modification, or any other Accident P. 192.

Accident that can govern them. The *Capacity* of being governed or us'd can never be the *Governour*, applying and uſing that Capacity. No, there muſt be at the Helm *ſomething diſtinct* that commands the Body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather ſink.

P. 193. VII. *The Soul of Man ſubſiſts after the Diſſolution of his Body*, or, *is immortal.* For being *immaterial*, it is *indiſcernible*, and therefore *incapable* of being diſſolv'd or demoliſh'd as Bodies are; ſuch a Being can only periſh by *Annihilation:* That is, it will continue to ſubſiſt and live, if ſome other Being, able to do this, doth not by a particular Act *annihilate* it. And if there be any Reaſon to believe, that at the Death of every Man there is always ſuch a particular Annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Even if the Soul *could be* material, this Matter muſt be ſo *perfectly united* in it's ſelf, ſo abſolutely *one*, (ſince all the Faculties and Acts of the Soul, or of the Mind, are all Faculties and Acts of the ſelf-ſame Thing) that
P. 194. the *leaſt* that can be allow'd is, that it ſhould be truly ſolid, and not *actually diviſible*; that is, ſuch as no *natural Cauſe*
P. 199, &c. can deſtroy. We may alſo conclude the Souls of Men to be immortal from the *Nature of God:* The *unequal* Diſpenſations

ſations of Happineſs or Miſery *here*, ſhew that there will be a *juſt* Retribution in a *future State* from a *perfect* Being, who cannot but deal *reaſonably* with all his Dependents. And if we conſider that Corruption, Vice, Iniquity, Folly, *P.* 207. at leaſt prevail here; can any one with *P.* 208. Reaſon imagine, that *Reaſon* ſhould be given, tho' it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguiſh'd?* May we not rather conclude, that there muſt be *ſome World*, where *Reaſon* will have it's Turn, and prevail and triumph? Some Kingdom of *Reaſon* to come? Laſtly, the general Conſent of Mankind in an *Expectation* of continuing to live in another State, *beyond the Grave*, and the *Reaſonableneſs* of that Expectation, is a farther Argument that there will be *ſuch* a State. A Man may thus reaſonably *P.* 209. meditate with himſelf: I am *a Being* certainly ſuperior to all other Creatures here, endu'd with reaſoning Faculties, and capable of an *Expectation* to live in *another State*. Muſt I then only ſerve to furniſh Duſt, to be mingled with the Aſhes of Herds and Plants, and with the Dirt under my Feet? This Argument grows *ſtronger* in the Apprehenſion of one, who is conſcious of Abilities and *intellectual Improvements*, which he had no Opportunity here of ſhewing

P. 210. or uſing. It grows *ſtronger ſtill* upon the Mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard Treatment he has met with without Cauſe from the World, cannot but make a *ſilent, humble Appeal* to that Being, who is his *laſt* and *true* Refuge, and who, he muſt believe, will not *deſert him thus.* And it is the *ſtrongeſt of all* to one, who beſides all this, *endeavours* in the Conduct of his Life to obſerve the Laws of *Reaſon*, (that is, of *his Nature*; and that is, of the *Author of Nature*, upon whom he depends) laments, and labours againſt his own *Infirmities*; implores the *divine Mercy*, prays for ſome *better State* hereafter, acts and lives in the *Hopes* of one, and *denies* himſelf many Things upon that View: One, who, by the Exaltation of his *Reaſon*, and that, which is commonly the Effect of real and uſeful Philoſophy, the Practice of *Virtue*, is ſtill approaching towards a higher Manner of being, and doth already taſte ſomething ſpiritual and above this World. If theſe Meditations and Reflections are well grounded, it muſt be reaſonable to think that God will ſatisfy a *reaſonable Expectation.*

P. 212. VIII. *The Soul when it parts from this groſs Body, will paſs by ſome Law into ſome new Seat or State, agreeable to the Nature*

Nature of it. Every Species of Beings muſt belong to *ſome* Region or State; and there being different Kinds of Abodes and Manners of ſubſiſting in the Univerſe, and the *Natures* of Things being alſo different, each Species is *adjudg'd* to it's proper Place, by the Courſe of Nature and Conſtitution of Things, or rather by the Author of them. And ſo when the Soul is diſengag'd from the Body, it muſt be either freed from the *Laws* of Bodies, and fall under *ſome other*, which will carry it to ſome *proper* Manſion or State; or at leaſt by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards, in Proportion to the Volatility of it's Vehicle (according to the Author's Hypotheſis, that the Soul is cloath'd in a *fine material* Vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inſeparably* mix'd with it, *vid. p.* 192, 193.) and of emerging out of theſe Regions into ſome *Medium* more ſuitable. Thus much as to the *general State* of Souls after Death. But then,

IX. *In this new State, or Place of Abode, there may be different Stations befitting the Differences of particular Souls among themſelves, as they are more or leſs perfect in their Kind.* We ſee even inanimate Bodies ſettle into ſome *Order* among themſelves, agreeable to their P. 213.

different Gravities, Figures, Impulſes, &c. And ſo by the ſame univerſal Rule in Nature (*viz.* that Differences in Things are attended with anſwerable Relations and Effects) *Souls* muſt alſo take their Situation in *ſome Kind* of Order, according to *their* Differences.

X. *The great Difference of human Souls, with Reſpect to Perfection and Imperfection, lies in their different Degrees and Habits of Reaſonableneſs and Unreaſonableneſs:* That is, not only in Mens *different* Improvements, or Neglects and Abuſe of their rational Faculties, but alſo in the greater or leſs Influence of theſe upon their Actions, and by Conſequence in their different Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice*. For a Man is accounted a *reaſonable* Man, when he reaſons rightly, and follows his Reaſon; in which Expreſſion Virtue muſt be included, (*vid. p.* 179. and elſewhere) being nothing but the *Practice of Reaſon and Truth.*

P. 214. Now the Soul having *two* Faculties, *one*, by which it underſtands, and judges, and reaſons; and *another*, by which it wills, or determines to act, according to the Judgments and Concluſions made in the upper Part of it; the more *perfectly* it performs theſe Operations, the more *perfect* certainly it muſt be in it's Kind;

Kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The *Perfections* therefore of human Souls, and the *contrary*, muſt be in Proportion to the foremention'd *Differences.*

XI. *According to theſe Differences then, it is reſonable to think that the Souls of Men will find their Stations in the future World.* This is but a Corollary from what goes before. Be ſure the more advanc'd and pure any State is, the more *properly* will the Inhabitants be rank'd, and the *juſter* and more *natural* will the Subordination of it's Members be. Then certainly thoſe Fields or States, in which the *virtuous* and *wiſe* ſhall meet, muſt be different from thoſe in which the *fooliſh* and *wicked* ſhall herd together. P. 215.

XII. *The Manſions and Conditions of the virtuous and reaſoning Part, muſt be proportionably better than thoſe of the fooliſh and vicious.* This muſt be true, if the Conſtitution of Things depends upon a reaſonable Cauſe, as it has been ſhewn it does. Hence it follows, that *the Practice of Reaſon* (in it's juſt Extent) *is the great Preparative for Death, and the Means of advancing our Happineſs through all our ſubſequent Duration.*

XIII. *In the future State Reſpect will be had not only to Mens reaſoning and Virtues, or the contrary, but alſo to their Enjoyments and Sufferings here.* Becauſe the *Inequalities* of this World can by no Means be redreſs'd, unleſs Men's Enjoyments and Sufferings, *taken together* with their Virtues and Vices, are compar'd and balanc'd. I ſay, *taken together*; becauſe no Reaſon can be aſſign'd, why a vicious Man ſhould be recompenc'd, for the Miſchiefs he *brings upon himſelf* by his Vices, as the natural Conſequences of them: Nor on the other Side, why any Deductions ſhould be made from the future Happineſs of a good Man upon the Score of thoſe *innocent* Enjoyments, which are the genuine Fruit of his Virtue, and ſound Reaſoning. Hence *wicked Men will* not only be leſs happy than the wiſe and virtuous, *but be really unhappy in that State to come.* For when all the Happineſs that anſwers to thoſe Degrees of Virtue, which they had, and thoſe Sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural Effect of their Wickedneſs; I ſay, when that is ſubtracted, what remains upon the Account will be ſomething below no Happineſs; which muſt be ſome Quantity of *poſitive Unhappineſs* or Miſery.

P. 216.

Thus

Thus there will be *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* hereafter; and Men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their Behaviour, Enjoyments and Sufferings in this preſent Life. But,

XIV. *If the Immortality of the Soul cannot be demonſtrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot.* To ſay, when a *Houſe* is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an *Inhabitant*, and that he is eſcap'd out of it, and lives in ſome other Place, can involve no Contradiction or Abſurdity. And,

XV. *If the Immortality of the Soul ſhould be conſider'd only as a Probability, or even as a Chance poſſible, yet ſtill a virtuous Life is to be preferr'd before it's contrary.* For if the Soul be *mortal*, it is but a little that a good Man *loſes* by his Virtue, very rarely more than ſome Acts of *Devotion*, or Inſtances of *Mortification*, which too by Cuſtom grow habitual and eaſy, and it may be *pleaſant* by being (or ſeeming at leaſt to be) reaſonable; and the vicious Man *gains* only ſuch Enjoyments, as moſt commonly owe their Being to a vitiated Taſte, grow inſipid in Time, are clogg'd with ſome Trouble or other; and at beſt, after a ſhort Time end in nothing, *as if they had never been.* But if the Soul P. 217.

proves *immortal*, the virtuous Man, beſides that his preſs'd Pleaſures, (if not ſo many) are more *ſincere* and *natural*, *gains* the Happineſs of another State, which may be preſum'd to be *immortal*, becauſe his Soul is ſo, and to be *truer* and *greater* than any of theſe low Enjoyments here, becauſe that State is every way in Nature above this. And the wicked Man not only *loſes* that Happineſs, which the virtuous Man gains *as ſuch*, but ſinks beſides into ſome Degree of the *Unhappineſs* of that future State: Of which one may ſay in general, that it may be as much greater than the Unhappineſs or Sufferings of this World, as the Happineſs and Joys of that are above thoſe of this.

Let this be added, that the *reaſoning* and *virtuous* Man has at leaſt this Advantage over the *fooliſh* and *profligate*, that his Wiſdom and Virtue will find Means to *alleviate* his Preſſures and Diſadvantages, with *Comforts* of which the other knows nothing; particularly this, the Enjoyment of an humble, but well grounded Expectation of *Felicity hereafter*, ſincere and durable.

P. 218. XVI. *He therefore, who would act according to Truth, muſt*, in the laſt place, *not only conſider what he is, and how circumſtantiated in this preſent State, and*

provide accordingly; but farther, muſt conſider himſelf alſo as one whoſe Exiſtence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How this may be done, by this time may be fully apprehended.

For a *Concluſion* of the whole; let our Converſation in this World, ſo far as we are concern'd and able, be ſuch as is agreeable to the *Truth* and *juſt Circumſtances of Things:* That is, let us act according to *Reaſon*; and that is, let us act according to the *Law of our Nature.* By *honeſtly endeavouring* to do this, we we ſhall expreſs our Duty to *him*, who is the Author of it, and of that Law; and at the ſame time proſecute our own *proper* Happineſs (the Happineſs of *rational* Beings) we ſhall do what tends to make us eaſy here, and be qualifying our ſelves, and preparing for our Removal hence to our long Home: That great *Revolution*, which at the fartheſt, cannot be very far off.

AN

AN
APPENDIX

Concerning the
Chriſtian Religion.

THUS, SIR, I have endeavoured to obey your Command, by giving you this View of the *Religion of Nature delineated.* I need ſay nothing to you, or to the World, of the Author's excellent Learning, great Abilities, and admirable Reaſoning. It is only Pity, we have not from ſo great a Maſter, a juſt

juſt *Pourtraiture* alſo of *revealed Religion* *, to vindicate it's divine Authority, and to do Juſtice to the great Principles of it. It is manifeſt, that it is abſolutely neceſſary we ſhould carry on our Enquiries farther, if there be in Fact any *revealed* Rule of our Faith and Practice. For there cannot be a more monſtrous Abſurdity, than to ſuppoſe Mankind at Liberty to reject, as they pleaſe, what is required of them by the ſupreme Author of their Being. I ſhall therefore beg leave to offer this ſmall humble Tribute to the Service of the *Chriſtian Religion*.

I. *It*

* *I don't know indeed whether the Author did not ſo deſign his Anſwer by this Book, to the firſt and ſecond Queſtions (at the beginning of it), as to ſuperſede the Neceſſity of his ſaying any Thing to the third, not by teaching Men to be contented with* natural Religion *only, if there be any other that is* revealed; *(for the contrary is expreſsly his Doctrine,* p. 211.) *but by enabling them to judge rightly for themſelves in all their ſubſequent Enquiries. It is certain the Principles of* natural Religion *are an excellent Rule, as far as they go, by which to judge of other Religions. For the* Religion of Nature *being founded on the Nature of Things, and by Conſequence deriving it's* Being, *if I may ſo expreſs it, from God, who is the Author of Nature, and containing Principles and Duties of eternal Obligation, I mean as long as the Nature of Things continue to be the ſame: Hence it follows, that whatever Religion is truly revealed from God, not only cannot*

I. *It is reaſonable to expect, that ſome revealed Religion ſhould be given to Men.* Becauſe without *ſuch* a Guide, Mankind would be left under too great *Uncertainties* in what concerns them *moſt* to know. It is true, the *Religion of Nature*, as *delineated* in this Book, is excellent and venerable, and may ſeem to ſome to ſuffice for the Duty and the Happineſs of Men. But from whence was even this great Writer enabled to enlarge his Views and Proſpects of it, and to give it ſo beautiful and large a Deſcription, but from the Aſſiſtances

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cannot be contradictory to thoſe Principles, but alſo muſt include them. And accordingly if there be any other Reaſon for the divine Authority of the Chriſtian Religion, *this Rule will certainly ſtrengthen and confirm it, and lead us to comply with ſo excellent an Inſtitution; as among all the various Sects into which it is divided (and 'tis the Nature of Men to be ſo divided) it will alſo enable us to diſcern that the Church of* England *is excellent in it's ſelf, and at leaſt equal to any other the beſt Churches upon Earth. I ſay, the Principles of* natural Religion *will teach us to do this, eſpecially as they are explained and treated of in this Book. Need I therefore ſcruple to ſay, that this Book, tho' there is not one Word directly in it of either, is yet a noble Defence of the* Chriſtian Religion, *and of the* Church of England? *But as this is probably what every one will not readily come into, it is allowable to wiſh, we had alſo an* explicite *Defence of both from ſo great a Writer, who had laid ſo well the Foundation for it.*

he

he and others, who have writ on the ſame Subject before him, have received from the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Inſtitutions? Let any one judge, whether he could otherwiſe have writ as he has done, even ſuppoſing him acquainted with all the other Learning in the World. It will be in vain to ſay, that what he has advanced, is founded on Principles of *natural Reaſon.* For great is the Difference between diſcovering Truth *at the firſt*, and being able to demonſtrate it's Reaſonableneſs, when it has been *already* diſcovered. We may in many Inſtances be well qualify'd to do the one, when we are pretty much, if not altogether, incapable of the other. The ancient Heathen *Philoſophers* wanted neither Inclination, nor Talents of Reaſon, for theſe or the like Enquiries. And ſince his Attainments and Reaſoning are ſo much ſuperior to theirs, is it not to be imputed to ſuch Advantages, which *he* was, but *they* were *not*, acquainted with? But even if it were owing to his ſuperior Genius, it is of little Advantage to the Bulk of Mankind, that *not* in every Age, or in every Countrey, but *now* and *then* only, and as it were by *Chance*, ſome great Man ariſes to demonſtrate the Truth, and fix the Doctrines and Duties of *natural Religion.* And the Experience of the World

hath

hath ſufficiently ſhewn, and undoubtedly will always ſhew, how much Vice and Ignorance (Ignorance I mean in *true* Religion) are apt to prevail, where Men have *nothing elſe* but their *natural* Reaſon for their *Guide*. Beſides, if but in one Caſe of Importance to us, we want ſome farther Guide, (as this Author was very ſenſible that we do, *p.* 211. and as ſome of the beſt and wiſeſt of the ancient Philoſphers alſo ſeem'd to be †) it is reaſonable to expect that God ſhould give it us; and certainly it muſt be reaſonable to think, to uſe our Author's Language, *p.* 210. that God will ſatisfy a *reaſonable Expectation*.

† —— Sed ut homunculus unus è multis probabilia conjectura ſequens, *Tull. Tuſc. queſt. Lib.* i. 9. *And again*, Harum Sententiarum quæ vera ſit, Deus aliquis viderit: quæ verisimillima, magna quæſtio eſt, *Ibid. p.* 11. *And* Socrates *in his Speech to his Judges*, utrum autem (ſc. vitam agere aut mori), dii immortales ſciunt: hominem quidem ſcire arbitror neminem, *Ibid.* 41. *And however* Tully *may ſpeak here as an* Academic, *or* Socrates *only to retain his Manner to the laſt, not to* affirm *any thing; and tho' what with them was allow'd to be but* probable, *was pretty much equal to the* Certainty *of others; yet if we conſider ſome at leaſt of their reaſoning on the Immortality of the Soul, it will I think be natural to conclude, that they wanted ſome farther Guide to give them greater Certainty of what they ſeem'd ſo deſirous to believe.*

II. *It has pleas'd God accordingly to reveal his Will to us by the Chriſtian Inſtitution*, or, *the Chriſtian Religion is true.* The *Miracles* which were wrought in Confirmation of it, *the Completion of the ancient Prophecies* concerning it, the *Honeſty and Integrity of the Promulgers of it*, the *ſpeedy Propagation of it* in the World, tho' contrary to the corrupt Cuſtoms and Manners of it, and nothwithanding all the Oppoſition it received from it, and laſtly, *the Truth and Excellency of* thoſe Things, which it teaches Men to believe and practiſe, are each of them *ſingly* a good Argument, and *all of them together* an invincible Proof of it's *divine Authority.* For to reject a Religion with theſe Advantages, is to make the *God of Truth* to be a *Deceiver* (abſurd and deteſtable Blaſphemy!) or at the leaſt implies that he is unconcern'd for Mankind, tho' they are his *Offspring*, were it only in permitting ſo many Things to concur in Favour of an Impoſture, which muſt needs prevail on every honeſt and impartial Mind to believe it.

As to the *Miracles* wrought in Confirmation of Chriſtianity, it's utter Enemies the *Jews*, I think, to this very Day confeſs them: And however they may by them or any other be denied, yet

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we have moſt certain Reaſon to believe thoſe Miracles were *indeed* performed, from the Manner of their Performance either before *Multitudes* of People, or *credible Witneſſes*, and that even in numberleſs Inſtances, in all which it was not poſſible for any human Contrivance conſtantly to deceive; and from the *conſtant Tradition* of a Belief of them to this Day from the firſt Witneſſes themſelves, when, for ſome Ages at leaſt, Men could have no Inducement to believe them, but the Conviction of their Truth: And the *Honeſty and Integrity* of the Promulgers of Chriſtianity, and Witneſſes of the Miracles of it, appear in all the *Marks* and *Evidences* that one Man can give of his Integrity to another, and in particular not only by their having no Inducement to deceive, but ſealing their Teſtimony even with their Blood, that is, by dying for it. And in ſome Caſes at leaſt, they could not poſſibly be deceived themſelves, and particularly in our Saviour's Reſurrection from the dead; which, as it is one of the great fundamental Articles of that Religion which they taught, ſo it is an invincible Proof of it's divine Authority.

As to the *Completion* in the New Teſtament of *Prophecies* in the Old, let

any reaſonable and impartial Man judge, whether it is poſſible that ſuch an Agreement of Things to ancient Predictions of divers Men, in divers Ages, and in ſo many Inſtances, could be the Reſult of Chance: For I think it is not pretended, that there was any human Contrivance either in forging thoſe Prophecies, or thoſe Events that are ſo correſpondent thereunto. But vain Men may think as they pleaſe; I may venture to foretel, that notwithſtanding the Efforts of impious Men, this will always be eſteemed by the judicious and wiſe a great and excellent Proof of the Truth of the *Chriſtian* Inſtitution. Let me here alſo add, that the Prophecies likewiſe of the New Teſtament are an Argument of it's divine Authority to all ingenuous Men.

With theſe Advantages, in Concurrence with it's own internal *Excellency*, of which ſomewhat will be ſaid immediately, it is, I confeſs, the leſs to be wonder'd at, that the *Chriſtian Religion* was ſo *ſpeedily propagated* in the World, notwithſtanding all the Oppoſition it received from the Malice, and Power, and Policy of it's Enemies, as no Wonder it had, and ſtill has Enemies in a diſtemper'd World. But without thoſe Advantages, how is it poſſible it ſhould have

have prevail'd, when there was nothing in it to flatter, but a great deal that oppos'd, the corrupt Inclinations of Men; and when the firſt Preachers of it had no Advantages of human Learning, or worldly Policy to perſuade or deceive, or Force of Arms to compel Men to become Converts to the *Chriſtian Faith*, but on the contrary were perſecuted, tho' innocent and defenceleſs, even unto Death? But they had indeed Advantages that were infinitely of greater Importance, and more proper for them: They had the utmoſt Honeſty and Integrity of Mind: They had the Aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit of God to proſper their noble and moſt beneficial Undertakings; and they had the Power of working Miracles, in Confirmation of that holy Religion of which they were the Preachers and Publiſhers. Such were the Means, by which both *Jews* and *Gentiles* were converted to the *Chriſtian Faith* by the holy *Apoſtles*, and theſe were their *Credentials* to the World.

Laſtly, ſince we have now ſeen the *Religion of Nature* drawn in ſo great Perfection by a maſterly Hand, it is very proper, were it only upon that Account, here to remark, that the *Agreement* of the Doctrines and Precepts

of Chriſtianity to thoſe of beſt and moſt refined *Reaſon* *, is a noble Confirmation

* *I ſuppoſe it will not be diſputed, but that the holy Scriptures teach us the Being, the Unity, the Providence, and the Perfection of God, and that he is to be worſhipped by us; that they teach us Juſtice and Charity towards Men, and forbid all Unmercifulneſs, Cruelty and Revenge; that they teach us to reſtrain all our unreaſonable Paſſions and Deſires; and laſtly, that they teach us a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. Theſe are the main Doctrines and Duties of the* Religion of Nature; *and if it be made at all an Objection, that theſe Writings moreover teach us other Doctrines, and enjoin us other Duties, which are not deducible from our natural Reaſon, it will vaniſh, when we conſider, that, if they are reveal'd from God, it is reaſonable to expect that they ſhould teach us ſome farther Truths, and enact ſome farther Laws than thoſe which are diſcoverable only by the Light of Nature. As to the Doctrines which are taught in the holy Scriptures, ſomewhat has been ſaid already; and to ſhew the Reaſonableneſs of the* Duties *they enjoin, let us conſider that the Precepts either of the* Jewiſh *or* Chriſtian Religions, *which are not of moral Obligation, are either ſome poſitive Rites or Inſtitutions, or temporal Precepts given for a particular Time or Purpoſe, or ſuch, as though they are of continual Obligation, yet ſeem, or really do lay ſome Reſtraint on Men in ſome Things allowable by the* Religion of Nature, *or oblige them to greater Heighths of Duty than this may require. As to the firſt, ſuch as the* Paſſover, *and other Rights among the* Jews, *and* Baptiſm *and the* Lord's Supper *among* Chriſtians, *it is eaſy to diſcern the Reaſon of the Inſtitution of moſt of them, at leaſt in the Condition and Circumſtances of the People to whom they were given, or the Nature of that Religion of which they*

tion of it's Truth. For it is utterly incredible in the Nature of Things, that

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they are Parts. And if perhaps we are not able at this Diſtance of Time to diſcover the Reaſon of ſome of the Jewiſh *Rights, it were Perverſeneſs to imagine there were no good Reaſon for their Inſtitution, when we can diſcern a Reaſon for the Inſtitution of of the reſt, and when moreover it is no Wonder we are often ſo unqualify'd to make a proper Judgment in Things of ſo remote Antiquity. For the ſecond, ſuch as the Command to the* Iſraelites *to ſpoil the* Egyptians, *or to deſtroy the* Canaanites *in the Old Teſtament, and that of our Saviour in the New, to the young Man to* ſell all that he had, and to follow him; *to be convinc'd that theſe are perfectly juſt, it will ſuffice to recollect that God is the ſupreme Lord and Proprietor of all; and if earthly Princes have in many Caſes a juſt Power over the Lives and Fortunes of their People, how much more muſt that Power be in him, whoſe Servants and whoſe Creatures they and the whole World are? And for the laſt, ſuch as the Precepts of* loving our Enemies, not reſiſting Evil, *or* contending for ſmaller Matters of the Law, *or the like; when theſe are rightly underſtood, they will appear to be highly excellent, and when duly practis'd, will entitle us to a greater Reward; inaſmuch as they exalt and improve our Virtue, by implanting in us not only a perfect Innocency of Temper, but a beneficent Diſpoſition even to thoſe who injure us; while at the ſame Time in Matters of any Conſequence they by no Means debar us of any juſt or legal Defence; nor in any Caſe do they require us to eſteem our* Enemies *to be our* Friends, *or to confide in them as* ſuch. *And if any ſhall ſuggeſt that the Obſervance of theſe Precepts, will the more expoſe us to* Evils, *let it ſuffice to obſerve, that 'tis impoſſible we can have a more* deſireable *Security from Evils, than that which ariſes from our Innocency and Goodneſs, and our Title to the Protection of God.*

Men of *no* Advantages of *human Learning*, nor of *ſpeculative* Lives, ſhould of themſelves find out the fineſt and nobleſt Rules of Morality, and teach the moſt rational and ſublime Doctrines of GOD, of his *Providence*, of a *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*, when it is by *Philoſophy* and *aſſiduous Reaſoning*, and a Life of *Leiſure* and *Contemplation*, that Men of *Learning* find out and demonſtrate, in any Degree of Perfection, the Truth and Reaſonableneſs of them. It will be in vain to object, that there are Doctrines of *Chriſtianity* above our Comprehenſion, when it appears that there are alſo ſuch, and muſt be, in the *Religion of Nature*, vid. p. 69. & 93. and even that there are numberleſs Myſteries even in Nature it's ſelf. And the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, however in ſome Reſpects above our poor finite Comprehenſion, yet in others are agreeable to the moſt perfect Reaſon. And let it be remembred, that one of the principal Cauſes of *Error* our Author aſſigns, is Mens pretending to judge of Things above them, and thence denying what there is the higheſt Reaſon to believe, only becauſe they cannot *comprehend it*, p. 59 †.

† *I beg leave to ſay ſomewhat here of the Doctrine of the* Trinity. *Our Author has prov'd that the Manner of God's Exiſtence is* above all our Conceptions,

III. *The Chriſtian Religion being true, it is to be believed and obey'd.* For not to do this, is direct Rebellion againſt God, who is the Author of it. Beſides, as it expreſsly *requires* our Belief and Obedience, we muſt be therefore, if it be *true*,

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tions, *and that his Eſſence or Nature is to us altogether* incomprehenſible, *p.* 69, 93. *He has alſo obſerv'd, that as God is a pure, uncompounded Being, his Attributes of* Mercy, Juſtice, *&c. cannot be as we conceive them, becauſe in him they are one,* p. 116. *What from hence I would obſerve, is, that there can be no Reaſon to reject the Doctrine of the* Trinity, *if it fairly appears, as ſurely it does appear to be taught us in the holy Scriptures. For if it be above our Comprehenſion, ſo is the* divine *Nature or Eſſence; and if his* Manner of being *is to us altogether incomprehenſible (to uſe our Author's Words,* p. 93 *) ſhall we preſume to determine that he cannot exiſt in three Perſons, but in one only? It will be ſaid perhaps, that this implies a Contradiction: But our eſteeming it ſo, ariſes only from our forming the ſame Notion of the Word* Perſon *in the* divine Nature, *as when it is apply'd to the* human. *It is not pretended that our Expreſſions in this Myſtery are by any Means* adequate, *or particularly that the Word* Perſon *is ſo. If it be therefore aſk'd what Notion we have of it in this Myſtery; we can ſay, without the leaſt Diminution of the Truth of the Doctrine, that we are by no means able juſtly to explain, or even conceive it, any more than it is a Diminution of God's* Juſtice *and* Mercy, *&c. when we own that we know not what thoſe Words mean in reſpect of him. And as we know not how three Perſons ſubſiſt in the Unity of the Godhead, ſo perhaps we are equally unable to account how* Attributes *in themſelves, according to our Apprehenſion,*

true, obliged to believe and obey it. And this is alſo a manifeſt Conſequence from that which is the prevailing Thought in this Book. For, to uſe the Author's own Words, whatever is immediately *reveal'd from God*, muſt, as well as any thing elſe, be treated as being *what it is*; which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheſt Regard, *believ'd* and *obey'd* *, p. 211. Wherefore,

IV. *Thoſe*

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diſtinct, ſhould be eſſentially *in one pure, uncompounded Being. And yet what Blaſphemy and Madneſs were it, for any one for that Reaſon to deny, that God is* merciful, juſt, wiſe, *&c. If therefore laſtly it be aſk'd, why we uſe the Word* Perſon *at all, when we own we have not, nor can have any adequate Idea in this Myſtery of what it means; the Anſwer is, becauſe it is the beſt that we know of to expreſs that Manner of Exiſtence in which the one God is repreſented to us in the holy Scriptures, that is, in ſuch a Manner as we would repreſent three diſtinct Perſons to one another here on Earth. In like Manner as we ſay that God is* juſt, merciful, *&c. though he cannot be ſo in that Senſe as Juſtice, Mercy,* &c. *are conceiv'd by us. And we muſt be contented to ſpeak but* as well as we can *in what is infinitely above us; and in our Notions and Expreſſions of our incomprehenſible, infinite Creator, a great deal muſt be indulg'd to the Infirmities and Imperfection of our poor mortal Nature.*

* *I chuſe to tranſcribe the whole of what our Author has ſaid here relating to reveal'd Religion, and I would have the Reader obſerve it well. Here, ſays he, I begin to be very ſenſible how much I want*

IV. *Thoſe who have the Opportunities of knowing the Chriſtian Religion, and of being convinc'd of it's Truth, ought by no Means to truſt their Souls even with the beſt Morality excluſive of it.* Becauſe this is the Method which the great Author of Nature and Morality has appointed for our *Duty* and our *Happineſs*. And it's well we have ſuch an Inſtitution to truſt to, wherein God himſelf is pleaſed to teach us what *Notions* we ought to have of him, and what it is he requires of us: An Inſtitution, by which we are aſſur'd that we poor *ſinful* Creatures have a *divine Perſon*, who is at the ſame Time alſo of our own Nature, to *reconcile* us to God, in whom we may ſafely

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want a Guide. *But as the Religion of* Nature *is my Theme, I muſt at preſent content my ſelf with that Light which* Nature *affords; my Buſineſs being, as it ſeems, only to ſhew what a Heathen* Philoſopher, *without any other Help, and almoſt* αὐτοδίδακτος, *may be ſuppoſed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elſe contain'd in this* Delineation, *can be the leaſt Prejudice to any other* true *Religion. Whatever is immediately* reveal'd from God, *muſt, as well as any thing elſe, be treated as being* what it is: *Which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheſt Regard,* believed *and* obey'd. *That therefore, which has been ſo much inſiſted on by me, and is as it were the Burthen of my Song, is ſo far from undermining true* reveal'd Religion, *that it rather paves the Way for it's Reception. Thus I take this Opportunity to remark to you once for all.* p. 211.

truſt,

truſt, if with ſincere Minds we *repent* of what we have done amiſs, and *honeſtly endeavour* to obey him. Let any *well-diſpoſed Man* ſay, whether he has not Reaſon to wiſh he had ſome *ſuch* Inſtitution to truſt to. The *Sinner*, who is conſcious of his *Guilt*, and dreads the Conſequences of it, may *certainly* be glad, that *hither* he can, and is even invited to flee for Refuge. And we have the greater Inducement to obey this divine Inſtitution, becauſe it is the Practice of *Truth* and *Reaſon* (that is, the Practice of *ſuch* Things as are fit for us in our Condition and Circumſtances to do) and the Way to *Happineſs*, that it requires of us. For,

V. And laſtly, *The Practice of Reaſon and Truth, the Way to Happineſs, and the Practice of Chriſtianity, where it is taught and known, incur the one into the other* †. For to believe and obey a Religion *reveal'd from God*, muſt of Neceſſity be an Obedience to *Truth* and *Reaſon*, and an infallible *Way* to our utmoſt *Felicity*. For no Religion can come from him, but what is true in it's ſelf, *reaſonable* and proper for us, and conducive to our *Happineſs*. And accordingly the

† Jeſus ſaith unto him, I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life, *Joh.* xiv. 6.

Chriſtian

Chriſtian Religion, upon the ſtricteſt Examination will appear to be ſo. This Book is a Teſtimony of it's Excellency, ſo far as it comprehends the *Religion of Nature*; and thoſe who know it well, cannot but diſcern that it is no leſs, but rather much more venerable and excellent, where it goes beyond it. So that the *Chriſtian Religion* is not a *Diminution*, but an *Improvement* of our Reaſon; nor does it deſtroy, but heighten the *Religion of Nature*. And whoever has gone *ſo far*, as this excellent Book can teach him, is ſo far in a *proper* Diſpoſition for it's Reception *.

Wherefore

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* *I believe the ſame Cauſes that* prejudice *Men againſt* Chriſtianity, *muſt alſo* prejudice *them againſt the* Religion of Nature, *at leaſt if it were ſettled and* eſtabliſh'd, *notwithſtanding the* Pretences *of ſome for it, to cover the* Hideouſneſs *of their Infidelity. Thus, if I miſtake not (for I have not the Book by me at preſent) the Author of the* Rights of the Chriſtian Church, *ſeemingly allows, if not contends, that thoſe who deny the Being of God, or a Providence, ought not, or have no Right, to be tolerated in Society. Yet I have Reaſon to believe that Author to be a* Spinoſiſt, *that is, a groſs Atheiſt. For which I appeal to the Sentiments of thoſe that know him well. By this, unleſs my Opinion of him is wrong, we may judge of that Set of Men. However, as to what I ſaid firſt, I take the Cauſes of Infidelity to be either one or more of theſe four,* viz. *a vain Fondneſs for ſingular Opinions, an Unwillingneſs to comply with the Morality of the Goſpel, enforc'd upon them by ſo ſevere Denunciations, the*

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Wherefore in my Opinion, great Eſteem of this Book, and great Reſpect for it's Author, is due from thoſe who have Value not only for the *Religion of Nature*, but alſo for the *Chriſtian Inſtitution*. And ſince ſome ſeem not to have too favourable Notions of the Deſign of this Book, it will not be improper to ſay ſomewhat here in Defence of the Author, were it only in *Juſtice*, as I conceive

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Superſtition, Hypocriſy or Knavery of ſome of it's Votaries, and laſtly, the Pride of Men in not ſubmitting to believe what they cannot comprehend. As for the firſt, there would be the ſame Occaſion for the Vanity of Men to ſhew it's ſelf, if the Religion of Nature *were the common Religion; and certainly if* that only *were in the World, the* Errors, *and* Vices, *and* monſtrous Superſtitions, *and* Falſhood *of Men, which in all Ages they are too apt to cover under the Notion of* Religion, *would not be leſs than what is now in the World. We may appeal for this to the Times of Heatheniſm, even not excepting thoſe Times when Learning among them flouriſh'd. And as to the* Unwillingneſs *of Men to comply with the* Rules *of the Goſpel, and the Severity of it's* Denunciations, *it is plain that* Vice *is condemn'd by* natural, *as well as* reveal'd *Religion; and we find that* future Puniſhments *as well as Rewards is a Doctrine of the one, as it is of the other. And what Madneſs is it for Men by a* vicious *or* wicked *Life to run the Hazard of thoſe Puniſhments, unleſs the vain Notions of Men could be ſuppoſed to alter the Nature of Things, or* diſannull *the* Declarations *of God himſelf? Wicked and profane Men ſhould therefore conſider, that if there*

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conceive it is but Juſtice, to his Memory. It is true, he has ſaid nothing *expreſsly* of the *Chriſtian Religion*; but as he expreſsly ſays, that the Religion of *Nature* is his Theme, ſo what he ſays there implies that there is ſome farther Light than that which *Nature* affords, and particularly expreſſes his Hope that nothing he has done in this *Delineation* can be the leaſt Prejudice to any other *true* Religion: Nay, that what he has done, is ſo far from undermining true *reveal'd Religion*, that it rather paves the Way for it's Reception, *p.* 211. Would any one ſay theſe Things, if he believ'd there were no *reveal'd Religion* at all,

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are Puniſhments *appointed for ſuch Men in a future State, their* perverſe Diſbelief *of them is no Ways likely to prevent them. And if they are reſolv'd to go on in their* own *Ways, they ought to be very ſure that no future Evils will enſue. As to thoſe Puniſhments, we may ſay in general, of what Nature ſoever they are, that they will be ſuch only as Men will deſerve, and as are fit for an infinitely wiſe and reaſonable Being to inflict upon them. And whatever they are, the Influence they ought to have upon us is, that we take the proper Method to* eſcape *them; and we may* certainly *eſcape them by the Practice of* Reaſon *and* Truth *(which to us includes the Practice of* Chriſtianity) *or by our ſincere and true* Repentance *and Return when we have gone aſtray. As to the laſt Cauſe I mention'd of Infidelity,* viz. *the Pride of Men in not ſubmitting to believe what they cannot comprehend, I refer the Reader to what I have ſaid above,* p. 72, 73.

unleſs he *prevaricated*; an Imputation ſurely injurious to this Author, who not only ſo much contends for *Truth*, but whom we have all the Reaſon to believe from this Book, to be no-leſs a ſincere and excellently virtuous, than a great, Man. And when the Reader has moreover conſider'd his frequent Quotations of the Fathers, and ſometimes too of the Scriptures, not as an Enemy would quote them (unleſs perhaps we except his Uſage, in a certain Place, of *Tertullian*, who certainly there deſerved to be uſed with ſome Severity; and for whom, as having fallen into *Montaniſm*, we have the leſs Reaſon to be concern'd): If he conſiders his ſpeaking of the Name by which *God calls himſelf* in *Moſes*'s Hiſtory, *p.* 68. *Notes*, (which were too favourable, not to ſay an *untrue*, Way of ſpeaking, if he believ'd that God never ſpake at all to *Moſes*:) His ſpeaking of *inviſible* and *ſuperior* Beings as *Miniſters* (in the Language of the Scripture) of God's Providence; and that there may be of theſe many *Orders*, riſing in Dignity of Nature and Amplitude of Power, *p.* 107, 108. agreeably to the Doctrine of *reveal'd Religion*: His Uſe of the Words *Trials*, *Temptations*, *Mortifications*, *Self-denial*, *Repenting* and *Forgiveneſs*, p. 121, 175, 176, 216. more certainly the Language

of

of a *Chriſtian Divine*, than a *Heathen Philoſopher:* His determining for *preconceiv'd Forms* of Prayer, *p.* 124. a Diſpute I think among *Chriſtians* only, and his condemning *cuſtomary Swearing*, no where that I know of prohibited in any *Heathen* Religion, or by any *Heathen Philoſopher*, p. 126. *Notes.* His Mention of the *Chriſtian Church*, and *her* Martyrologies, *p.* 202. and his calling this ſomewhere a *diſtemper'd World*, agreeably to our Opinion of the Corruption of human Nature conſequent upon the Fall of Man: His baniſhing of *Oſtentation*, and *needleſs Repetitions* from our Prayers, *p.* 122, 124. according to our Saviour's Doctrine: The Manner in which he has mention'd the Form of Solemnization of Matrimony among us, *p.* 157. *Notes:* And laſtly, his ſeeming to include himſelf in the Number of *Chriſtian Divines*, where he is mentioning the two Tables of the Law, *p.* 164. *Notes:* I ſay, when the Reader has conſider'd theſe Things, I think he may be truſted what Opinion to form of the Author's Sentiments in Relation to *Chriſtianity*. I do not pretend to have enumerated every Thing that might be proper on this Occaſion to be referr'd to. Somewhat more of this Kind might be added, if it were neceſſary; but the whole are but ſuch Things as I could recol-

recollect, or obſerve by a very curſory Review. However, I am not willing to omit taking Notice of the Author's Manner of treating ſuch as the profeſſed Enemies of *Chriſtianity* are, which is certainly not with that Favourableneſs as might have been expected from one, who was in any reſpect of their Number. So very much, ſays he in in one Place, are thoſe Gentlemen miſtaken, who by *following Nature*, mean only complying with their bodily Inclinations, *&c.* *p.* 13. And in another, thus Men, ſays he, affecting to appear Free-thinkers, ſhew themſelves to be but half Free-thinkers, or *leſs*, p. 20. And again, ſpeaking of the Syſtem of *Spinoſa*, as *apparently* falſe and full of Impieties and Contradictions, he juſtly wonders, that ſuch groſs Atheiſm as this ſhould ever be faſhionable, *p.* 76. *Notes.* Elſewhere he tells us, he cannot without a Degree of Indignation find a ſort of Writers pleaſing themſelves with having diſcover'd ſome unciviliz'd Nations, which have little or no Knowledge of the Deity, *&c.* and then applying their Obſervations to the Service of Atheiſm; as if Ignorance could prove any Thing, or alter it's Nature by being general, *p.* 58. *Notes.* Nor laſtly, is he any ways favourable to *Epicurus* or his Followers, who in

ſome

ſome Reſpects ſurely are the favourite Sect of our *modern Infidels.* He ſays, that " in Fact the Generality of *Epi-* " *curus*'s Herd have ſunk into groſs " Voluptuouſneſs, notwithſtanding all " his Talk of Temperance, Virtue, " Tranquillity of Mind", *&c. p.*24. And in the Notes, he ſays, that " their " Pleaſures have not continued to be " always like thoſe in the little Gardens " of *Gargettus.* Nor indeed that they " do ſeem ſo very virtuous even " there", *&c.*. And in *p.* 54. he ſays, " to think the Sun is not bigger than " it appears to the Eye to be", (which was *Epicurus*'s Opinion and his Followers; " *Tantulus ille — Sol,* Lucr. " Poor Creature"! as he ſays in the Notes) " ſeems to be the laſt Degree " of Stupidity. He muſt be a Brute, " ſo far from being a Philoſopher, who " does not know", *&c.* I don't know how the Author of the Diſcourſe of *Free-thinking* can forgive him, for uſing ſo ſcurvily one of his favourite Free-thinkers amongſt the Ancients.

After all, whatever becomes of the Opinion of any one Man, or Number of Men, *the Foundation of God ſtandeth ſure.* He *cannot be a Liar*, and we know it is he that ſpeaks to us by the *Chriſtian* Inſtitution. Wherefore let us rejoice in ſo great a Bleſſing and Privilege,

which he hath vouchſafed to us. Let us comply with this divine Inſtitution, with that *Chearfulneſs* and *ready Obedience* which it's *Authority* and it's *Excellency* demand. When we have done amiſs, let us *turn to God*, and *truſt in his Mercy*. By *honeſtly endeavouring* to do theſe Things, we ſhall expreſs our Duty to him, who is the Author of that holy Inſtitution, and of our Being; and at the ſame Time make the only *true* Proviſion for the juſt Peace and Tranquillity of our mortal Lives here, and for our obtaining a happy Immortality hereafter.

And now, Sir, your Trouble is almoſt over: Part of it you have brought upon your ſelf, as being what you *deſired* from me; and for this *Appendix*, let me leave it with you, as an *humble Monument* of one that meant well. I ſeem to my ſelf to have now ſome Right to ſpeak in our Author's Language. I will therefore make no Apology for doing ſo. However, I aſſure you, your good Opinion of what I have done, will be very agreeable to me: But whatever you ſhall think of it, you will pleaſe to receive it kindly, as a ſincere Teſtimony of that Reſpect and Friendſhip, with which I am,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient,

and obliged humble Servant.

POSTSCRIPT.

MR. *Wollaſton*'s Poem on *Eccleſiaſtes* was not come to my Hands, till after I had writ this *Appendix*. It is in my Opinion a Curious Book: I ſpeak not of it's *Poetry*, and therefore I hope the Poets will not condemn me for this Judgment. However, the Reader need only look into a few Paſſages of that Book, to be convinc'd of the Author's Sentiments in relation to *reveal'd Religion*. I wiſh that the making any Defence for him at all in this Reſpect, may not be an Injury to his Memory. My Apology for it is, that to ſome there ſeems to be ſome Neceſſity for it. To theſe Men I take Leave to obſerve, that we can never do *Chriſtianity* Service, by charging great Men wrongfully with any Opinions, or Deſigns that are injurious to it. The Enemies of our Faith will be glad to have ſuch Men thought to be of their Side, and will not fail to make their Advantages of it. *Truth*, by whomſoever, or for what End ſoever advanc'd, can be no Prejudice to that which is of divine Original, and proceeds from the Fountain of *Truth* and Reaſon. And if any great Man happens in ſome Things to be miſtaken, let him not be treated

as an Enemy for it, eſpecially when there is no Appearance of any ill Deſign: And none ſurely ought to be ſuſpected of ill Deſigns, without at leaſt ſome very probable Appearance of them. And in ſmaller Opinions let us never ſhew a greater Zeal, than thoſe Opinions deſerve. By ſuch a Temper, in my Judgment, we ſhall not only do that which is reaſonable and proper in it's ſelf, and agreeable to the Spirit of *Chriſtianity*, but alſo beſt conſult the Intereſt of this our holy Religion too.

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FINIS.

ERRATA.

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9. *All*

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AN Eſſay in the Socratick Way of Dialogue, on the Exiſtence of a Divine Being, in Imitation of *Tully*'s Tuſculan Queſtions. With Notes. By *Roger Davies*, Maſter of the Free-School in *Carmarthen*.

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